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Abstract 
Of nearly 1500 European Union directives enacted between 1978 and 1997, over 65% 
had at least one infringement case opened against a member state for noncompliance. 
Existing research has considered the problem of infringement by either focusing upon timing 
alone or upon total numbers of infringements. These approaches incorrectly assume that all 
infringements are alike and thus can be addressed as parts of the same phenomenon. While 
some common factors contribute to higher levels of infringements overall, e.g. incapacities 
within the bureaucracy and complexity of the directives to be enacted, three factors separate 
late from substantive infringements: preferences, power, and opportunity. Infringements have 
a common source: disagreement by national political actors (policy-area minister and coalition 
members) regarding a directive but whether this disagreement transforms into substance or 
delay depends. Substantive infringements arise when three conditions are simultaneously 
present: the national political actors not only disagree with a directive, AND they have the 
power to affect national legislation, AND they have the opportunity to do so, in the national 
parliament. Late infringements arise when only some of these conditions are present: when 
national political actors disagree but lack tools to substantively influence legislation, e.g. when 
 xiii 
coalition members have weak parliamentary powers but disagree with directive content, or 
when strong national parliaments are involved in the passage of legislation during the 
transposition process.  
This dissertation analyzes the incidence of state noncompliance among EU member 
states using a novel approach on a new dataset. With these tools, I not only explain factors 
relevant to late and substantive infringements but also why previous research has been 
unable to provide this explanation until now.  
 
 1 
Chapter I: Introduction 
The European Union, formerly known as the European Coal and Steel Community 
(later as simply the European Community), plays an increasingly large role in the lives of 
European citizens. Membership in the European Union requires compliance with mandates 
set forth in state directives, and those directives span an increasingly broad spectrum of 
policy domains. While countries initially came together to help coordinate the trade of 
commodities such as coal and steel, the objectives of the union have evolved over time. As 
the purview of the EU expanded, so did the domain and reach of directives.  
To understand the rapid expansion, consider how directives have changed: there were 
few directives in effect in the 1970s, but by 2012 there were 1,989 directives in force (COM 
2013). Directives require state compliance, and member states need to enact or adapt 
national legislation to satisfy legislative mandates set by directives. The enactment of national 
legislation in the process of complying with a directive is called transposition and requires that 
states implement the directive correctly and in a timely manner. Directives enable the 
coordination of national legislation on topics to provide an even playing field for citizens in EU 
member states.  
Noncompliance with these directives by member states continues to be a problem for 
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the EU and, in particular, social policy directives are often prone to poor implementation within 
member states with states failing to meet implementation deadlines (typically 18 months to 2 
years after legislation’s passage) or by enacting national measures that are inconsistent with 
the directives. Failure to meet legislative mandates set forth in directives results in official 
citation by the European Commission and triggers infringement proceedings, which can 
involve fines.  
Agents from the member states draft EU legislation yet the states frequently struggle to 
comply with the directives their representatives helped negotiate. Why do states agree to 
commitments they cannot, or will not, honor? This problem is not new to political science: 
scholars such as Simmons (2000), among many others, study state compliance with treaties 
and other international agreements finding that states often fail to comply to agreements 
they’ve entered into. However, member state noncompliance in the EU is particularly puzzling 
because of how states fail to comply with legislation. Some states drag their feet, delaying 
national implementation, while others enact legislation that is incorrect or never enforced.  
Political scientists do not understand the mechanisms behind these different forms of 
noncompliance. There are two types of noncompliance, late and substantive, and different 
causal factors contribute to their incidence. The conflation of late and substantive 
infringements confuses things. Because timing and substance violations occur for different 
reasons, one cannot expect that using a single, undifferentiated approach would shed light on 
the conditions for noncompliance. In the pages that follow, I explain that policy-area 
ministerial preferences over legislation cause late implementation and that the constellation of 
national actors (including national veto players and the presence of a strong national 
parliament) affects substantive noncompliance. 
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The Case of the Pregnant Workers Directive 
  
 The pregnant workers directive of 1992 aimed to improve workplace environments for 
pregnant and nursing women in European Union member states. It included 14 minimal 
standards with the intent “to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of 
pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding” 
(Article 1, also cited by Falkner et al 2007, pg. 73). The directive gave states an average 
implementation period of two years to comply with the directive. 
The pregnant workers directive lays out a number of requirements and also includes 
some flexibility: states must provide a minimum of 14 weeks of maternity leave but can 
provide more and are permitted latitude in the pay workers receive. States are also permitted 
some discretion to define what ‘recently given birth’, ‘pregnant worker’ and ‘breastfeeding 
worker’ mean. For example, Greece counts women who have given birth in the last two 
months as having ‘recently given birth’ while in Ireland, it is women who have had a child 
within the last 14 weeks. (COM 1999 100 Final). Similarly, in Greece, breastfeeding women 
are covered up to one year while in Ireland it is 6 months and 9 months in Spain (COM). 
Additionally, states are free to have some means of addressing how ‘pregnant’ workers notify 
their workplace of their pregnancy and the period in which workers qualify for this designation 
(the number of months after birth that a worker is entitled to benefits). What states cannot do 
is impose additional restrictions upon workers, such as provide restrictions for pregnant 
employees that do not apply to other employees. States may not, for example, require 
pregnant employees to notify their employers of their pregnancy with a medical certificate or 
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otherwise affect the rights of a pregnant employee in comparison to other employees. 
 Despite these clear guidelines and the fact that many states already had a number of 
the directive’s provisions already in place, several member states still failed to comply. Seven 
states had infringement proceedings initiated against them as early as 1995 for failing to 
notify the Commission of measures enacted to comply with the directive—meaning the states 
were dragging their feet on implementation: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and Portugal. In some cases, as with France, states disagreed with some of the 
provisions set forth in the directive and thus refused to transpose the directive. For example, 
French officials felt France had superior legislation to that set forth in the directive (Galligan, in 
Abels and Mushaben 2015, pg 112) while Sweden objected to the compulsory requirement for 
two weeks of maternity leave (Falkner et al 2004). The Swedish government argued that its 
fourteen weeks of optional leave satisfied the directive’s mandate and thus no further action 
while necessary while the Commission held that the directive mandated compulsory leave. 
After receiving communication from the Commission about their noncompliance, the delayed 
states, aside from Luxembourg, quickly complied and reported national measures as required 
by the directive. Luxembourg delayed implementation until 1998 because of disagreements 
with the requirements of the legislation.1  
  
Luxembourg and the Pregnant Workers Directive 
 
As a member of the EU, Luxembourg is under obligation to enforce and support 
existing EU legislation. However, Luxembourg’s disagreement with the directive interfered 
                                                       
1 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/commission-reviews-implementation-of-
 5 
with a full and correct transposition of the directive, a decision that affected the employment of 
many pregnant workers, among them Ms. Virginie Pontin.“Ms Virginie Pontin [a pregnant 
employee] worked for the Luxembourg company T-Comalux from November 2005. On 25 
January 2007 she was notified of her dismissal with immediate effect ‘on grounds of serious 
misconduct’ consisting of ‘unauthorised absence for more than three days’.”2 This dismissal, 
related to Ms. Pontin’s pregnancy, violated the pregnant worker’s directive and was thus in 
violation of the directive’s mandate. Luxembourg, in compliance with the pregnant workers 
directive, made clear that pregnant employees could not be dismissed for her condition. 
However, Luxembourg’s restrictive application of the directive permitted Ms. Pontin to file a 
suit against her employer only within 15 days of her dismissal.  
While the actions of T-Comalux violated the directive, Luxembourg's transposition of 
the directive also failed to comply with the directive’s mandate that employees have recourse 
to address unfair dismissals and that this recourse be in line with other domestic issue 
timeframes. Because Luxembourg limited the period in which employees could file a suit 
against their dismissal, the European Court of Justice, ECJ, opened an infringement case 
against Luxembourg for its improper application of the directive.3,4,5  
 The case of Ms. Pontin in the example above highlights how important, many of these 
provisions can be in citizens’ daily lives. Without the protection of these directives she would 
                                                       
2 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_CJE-09-98_en.htm 
3 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62008CC0063 
4 The court ultimately found (C-63/08) that the referring court needed to specifically evaluate the duration of 15 
days to determine whether the period “provided however that those rules are no less favourable than those 
governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and are not framed in such a way as to render 
practically impossible the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness)”  
5 Luxembourg also had a number of problems in implementation, including requiring pregnant women to not only 
notify their employers but to do so by registered mail, to send their employers a medical certificate and to 
affiliate with a social security scheme 
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have no repercussion for the discriminatory treatment she received. However, as the example 
also highlights, it is unfortunate that the enactment of directives is often not sufficient to 
guarantee citizens the rights promised or standards set forth by such directives. In the case of 
the pregnant workers directive, full compliance was not achieved without intercession by the 
ECJ and the Commission’s initiation of infringement proceedings against member states. 
 From the scholarly perspective, explaining the behavior of Luxembourg and other 
member states regarding the implementation of directives, including the pregnant worker’s 
directive, has proven quite difficult. Despite many studies on noncompliance, as the next 
chapter discusses, the findings have been inconsistent regarding the key factors contributing 
to state noncompliance. A primary contribution of this dissertation is to share that these 
studies have failed to distinguish between the two key types of noncompliance, late and 
substantive noncompliance. The case of Luxembourg highlights these two aspects of 
noncompliance: in this example, ministerial disagreement explains the delayed 
implementation while the strong and involved parliament, coupled with a moderate number of 
veto players, contributed to substantive noncompliance. An explanation focused upon only the 
timing of national compliance, whether Luxembourg was late or not, would have missed the 
subsequent substantive noncompliance of the state.  
Not only would missing this distinction weaken the overall understanding of 
noncompliance it would also significantly undermine abilities to understand whether and why 
directives succeed; substantive infringement is difficult to detect, occurs for reasons distinct 
from late infringements, and is caused by factors (the involvement of national parliaments) 
that are increasing over time. Thus, we can expect that substantive infringements will become 
more prevalent yet more difficult to detect without further study of substantive infringements 
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as a phenomenon distinct from late infringements.  
Overview 
 
This chapter provides the necessary background to understand the general institutional 
structure of the European Union relevant to my investigation. In this chapter, I discuss 
relevant types of legislation, and the drafting process, in addition to the commission 
infringement procedure. Readers familiar with EU institutions and the obligations for states to 
comply with legislation, and the subsequent infringement procedure, will find this chapter a 
helpful reminder while readers unfamiliar with the EU will find the information they need to 
understand the context of the implementation process and the relevant vocabulary for the 
process. 
Noncompliance 
 
 Compliance refers to whether states meet their obligation of enacting national 
legislation to transpose, and implement a directive in a timely and correct fashion with respect 
to the mandate of the directive. Member state compliance is important for the functioning of 
the EU. There has been continued research on the “transposition deficit”, calculated as the 
number of in-force directives yet to be transposed by member countries relative to the existing 
body of in-force legislation, and its reduction over time. Member state failure to properly enact 
or apply legislation is costly for business and citizen constituents in the individual member 
states who are not able to receive the same benefits and rights they are permitted by law. For 
example, in the cases of marketplace regulation, when new obligations for the market are 
passed, compliance with directives that mandate higher levels of environmental responsibility, 
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for example, can put compliant companies at a disadvantage in comparison to companies 
that flaunt these additional regulations and therefore do not incur the costs of additional 
precautions, etc. To ensure compliance, the Commission is empowered to check on states 
during the transposition process. 
 Thus, directives are important and can significantly affect the lives of citizens, and the 
compliance with these directives is not guaranteed. Furthermore, how states fail to comply 
with these directives can occur in different ways: states can delay implementation or enact 
incorrect legislation and they often delay, write incorrect measures, or even both, quite often. 
Of European Union directives enacted between 1978 and 1997, nearly 67% had at least one 
infringement case opened against a member state for noncompliance.  
 Existing research has considered the problem of infringement by either focusing upon 
timing alone or upon total numbers of infringements. These approaches incorrectly assume 
that all infringements are alike and thus can be addressed as parts of the same phenomenon, 
yet this assumption does not appear to hold.  
When tabulating the number of infringement cases by member state in the period of 
1978-1999, the correlation between the total number of late and total number of substantive 
infringements for states is merely 0.73. 
 While this is a moderately strong correlation, suggesting that tendencies toward late 
and substantive infringement do relate, the remaining variation (more than 25%) indicates that 
the two types of infringements do not move in tandem. This observation has been supported 
in the few pieces that have considered types of infringements separately (Thomson 2007, 
König and Mäder 2013, Mastenbroek 2007). These authors have indicated that some states 
may choose to trade between late and substantive infringements at different rates and for 
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different reasons—that is, they are not substitutable. Furthermore, states that perform poorly 
on one measure, do not necessarily perform poorly on the second, something missed by the 
literature’s broad approach to infringements. For example, despite Portugal’s reputation for 
poor compliance, Portugal had fewer substantive infringement cases (201) than either 
Germany or the UK (at 286 and 216, respectively) between 2002 and 2009.  
 While some common factors contribute to higher levels of infringements overall, e.g. 
incapacities within the bureaucracy and complexity of the directives to be enacted, three 
factors distinguish late from substantive infringements: preferences, power, and opportunity. 
Infringements have a common source: disagreement by national political actors (including the 
policy-area minister, coalition members in the government) regarding a directive but whether 
this disagreement transforms into substantive or late noncompliance depends. . Substantive 
infringements arise when three conditions are simultaneously present: the national political 
actors not only disagree with a directive, AND they have the power to affect national 
legislation, AND they have the opportunity to do so, in the national parliament. Late 
infringements arise when only some of these conditions are present: when national political 
actors disagree but lack tools to substantively influence legislation, e.g. when coalition 
members have weak parliamentary powers but disagree with directive content, or when 
strong national parliaments are involved in the passage of legislation during the transposition 
process.  
 The European Union, in response to state complaints about the increasingly irrelevant 
role national parliaments held in legislating, has moved to make national parliaments more 
relevant. The increasingly powerful role of parliaments in drafting and transposing directives is 
likely to contribute to higher levels of substantive infringements while appearing to reduce late 
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infringements. Because infringements stem from conflict, analyzing them jointly can seem 
logical but approaches that conflate these two types of infringements will miss the potential 
tradeoff between timing and substance. Combining late and substantive infringements will 
lead researchers to not only misunderstand the mechanisms behind these distinct types of 
infringements, but they will conclude that the involvement of parliament will potentially move 
member states toward greater levels of compliance when it indicates the opposite: more 
opportunities for unrecognized substantive noncompliance. My approach demonstrates that 
the distinction of substantive infringements captures a phenomenon that is likely to increase 
over time as parliaments become increasingly involved in transposition, contributing to ever-
higher numbers of infringements and further weakening the impact of enacted directives. 
Furthermore, my analysis provides an explanation for why and when late and substantive 
infringements are likely to occur, something the literature has so far overlooked. 
Legislation Design and Obligations in the European Union 
 
 The European Union (EU) offers an interesting balance between autonomy and 
interdependence for its 28 member countries: members retain their own sovereignty while 
agreeing to implement and comply with EU legislation. Today there are 28 member states, but 
the EU began with just six states (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg) signing a treaty to commonly manage coal and steel. From this initial starting 
point, the 28-member union covers over 4 million km2 and has 503 million inhabitants (“Living 
in the EU” n.d.). There are three branches of the EU and many independent agencies, all of 
which have helped produce and now oversee the the more than 40,000 legal acts, 15,000 
Court verdicts, 62,000 international standards, and over 34,000 secondary legislative acts 
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(“Number of Laws” 2015).  
A Brief History 
 
 The original six member countries, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands, came together to jointly manage coal and steel markets in the 1950s. The 
European Union began as the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and later became the European Economic Community after the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. The 1990s saw more changes in the EU as it transitioned to a more organized 
and powerful federation with the Treaty on the European Union being signed in 1992, the 
Schengen Agreement of 1995 enacted, the signing of three additional treaties: the 1997 
Treaty of Amsterdam, 2002 Treaty of Nice and 2007 Treaty of Portugal.  
 The 1992 Treaty on European Union formally changed the name of the group of 
member states from the European Community to the European Union and created a 
framework for a stronger unification of Europe. While the 1995 Schengen Agreement made 
travel between the seven countries of the agreement (Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) much easier as no passport was required 
for entering and exiting within these states. In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam expanded the 
1992 treaty, discusses institutional reform and also expands the EU's reach into policy on 
citizen affairs.  
 
 
EU expansion 
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 There have been six waves of expansion of the Union, taking membership from the 
original six to the new 28 (with several more waiting in the wings).6 These different waves 
occurred in 1973 (Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom), 1981 (Greece), 1986 (Spain 
and Portugal), 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden), 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia), 2007 (Bulgaria and 
Romania) and 2013 (Croatia) (EU Enlargement, n.d.). 
Bodies of the European Union 
 
 There are many layers within the EU organizational structure that begins the European 
Council and its rotating six-month presidency, which cannot set legislation but determines the 
general policy direction of the EU's three legislative bodies (the European Parliament, Council 
of the European Union, and the European Commission). 
European Parliament 
 
 Members of the EU have directly elected the European Parliament members since 
1979 and representatives sit by political groups rather than national delegations. The 
Parliament passes laws, in conjunction with the Council, monitors other EU institutions, and 
sets the EU's budget, with the Council. 
Council of the European Union 
 
                                                       
6 Note that this dissertation was defended in June of 2016, prior to the UK vote to leave the European Union. As 
of this last edit, in July of 2016, exactly whoe (and if) this exit is to transpire remains to be determined by the 
EU and UK. 
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 The Council of the EU represents member-state governments in the EU, keeping the 
interests of the EU as a whole in mind. The Council members are national ministers from 
each member country and the presidency rotates between member countries as well, much 
like the presidency of the European Council. The Council of the EU, with the European 
Parliament and Commission, passes laws, signs agreements between the EU and other 
countries, approves the EU budget (with the Parliament), and coordinates cooperation 
between courts and police forces of member countries.  
European Commission 
 
 Finally, the European Commission, like the Council of the EU, also represents the 
interests of the EU as a whole. The Council of the EU is responsible for enacting legislation 
proposed by the Commission. The European Council nominates the president of the 
Commission and the President assigns each country's commissioner specific policy areas 
upon which to focus. In addition to the 28 commissioners, there is a permanent staff that 
keeps the Commission running. 
European Legislation 
 
 The Community Acquis contains the existing in-force legislation of the European Union, 
spanning thirty-five chapters. Over time, the number of chapters, each relating to different 
policy areas (such as 'Competition' and 'Energy'), has expanded both in the amount of 
legislation required and the detail given. All legal requirements are contained within the acquis 
and each chapter must be negotiated and evaluated with each prospective country before 
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membership is finalized. The Acquis also specifies that all member countries must make 
provisions to enact and implement future directives and mandates as they are created. Thus, 
all member countries are obligated to transpose the body of EU legislation that exists prior to 
their membership, and to maintain compliance during the tenure of their membership.   
 There are two forms of legislation: primary and secondary. Primary legislation, the 
Treaties,7 lays out the distribution of institutional powers and functions in the EU. Secondary 
legislation details the specifics for the functioning of the EU and member states. Succinctly, 
primary law lays out how things will be done (who has power to limit whom and when) while 
secondary law lays out what will be done (e.g., what taxes are to be shared and how they are 
to be calculated). Secondary law, discussed in Article 288 of the Treaty on The Functioning of 
the EU (TFEU), is divided into four categories: regulations, directives, decisions, and opinions 
& recommendations. Two of these categories are effectively binding for all states8 (regulations 
and directives), one is binding for the addressees (decisions),9 and one is non-binding 
(opinions, targeted to particular states) and recommendations, directed at all states)10. 
Drafting of Legislation 
 
 Legislation (specifically, regulations and directives) can be drafted by the Council 
alone, the Commission, or the Commission and the European Parliament. Initially, the Treaty 
of Rome (1957) afforded the EP an ‘advisory role’ in policy design which amounted to very 
                                                       
7 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). 
8 Regulations and directives are almost always directed to all member states or, at the minimum, categories of 
states rather than individuals. 
9 Although after the Treaty of Lisbon, decisions are no longer required to be specifically addressed (they may be 
general). Decisions are increasingly used in the policy-area of Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
10 Recommendations and opinions are “little more than suggestions or tentative proposals” (Watts 2008) and are 
not binding for member states or other addresses. 
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little. The roles of the different EU institutions (and the institutions themselves) are set out in 
the successive treaties on the European Union and the role of the EP has evolved (and 
expanded) over time. 
 The Brussels treaty, signed in 1965, created a single Commission and single Council 
to serve the member countries.11 The Single European Act, signed in 1986, altered qualified 
majority voting in the Council and increased the influence of the EP through the cooperation 
procedure12. The previously small role of the EP expanded in 1991 with the Treaty of the 
European Union (Hertiér et al 2013) and the establishment of Co-Decision. In the treaty of 
Maastricht (signed in 1992), the EP was granted the right to initiate legislation.13 The treaty of 
Amsterdam (signed in 1997) increased the number of policy domains covered by the EU, 
extended the codecision procedure and qualified majority voting. The treaty of Nice (signed in 
2001) made fewer changes, primary among them the simplification of the ‘enhanced 
codecision procedure’. The 2007 treaty of Lisbon made wide-reaching reforms, including a 
new allocation of competencies between the EU and member states and modifying the way 
decisions are made in the then-27 member EU. New policy domains were added to the 
legislative competencies and legislative powers of the institutions were enhanced.  
 Through this evolution, the legislative process has been broadened and the power of 
the European Parliament (EP) expanded through the development of three procedures, 
cooperation, codecision, and the ordinary legislative procedure.  
Cooperation Procedure 
 
                                                       
11 http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm 
12 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:xy0023 
13 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130619/LDM_BRI(2013)130619_REV2_EN.pdf 
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 The cooperation procedure was introduced in the Single European Act (SEA), along 
with the assent procedure. The cooperation procedure was the first procedure to be set out in 
a separate treaty article, where other articles referred to it, and applied to approximately one-
third of legislation (Hix and Høyland 2011). The procedure increased the powers of the 
European Parliament by permitting a second reading and reducing the Council’s ability to 
overturn EP amendments made in the second reading. The assent procedure required the 
approval of the EP before the Council could act, including association agreements with non-
EC states and the accession of new member states. The assent procedure was later 
extended by the Maastricht Treaty. 
 Codecision Procedure (and Enhanced Codecision Procedure or ‘Co-decision II’) 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 introduced the codecision (also referred to as ‘co-decision’) 
procedure in a separate article, much like the cooperation procedure in the SEA. With the 
introduction of the codecision procedure, the EP and Council became legislative equals. This 
procedure again strengthened the power of the EP and introduced provisions should 
disagreements arise between the EP and Council over legislation. In such a case, a 
conciliation committee of equal members from each body would be convened. The EP and 
Council would then approve the committee’s proposal. This procedure applied to the 
provisions previously covered under the cooperation procedure and also incorporated new 
areas that were introduced by the Maastricht Treaty: public health, consumer protection, 
education, and culture (Hix and Høyland 2011).  
 The extension of the codecision procedure by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 permitted 
the adoption of legislation at the first reading if both the EP and Council could agree. The 
conciliation committee, formerly the penultimate phase of legislation (after which the Council 
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and EP would need to pass the committee’s arrangement), became the final stage of the 
legislative process. Failure to reach an agreement equated to no legislation.  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure 
 
 The 2009 Lisbon Treaty significantly extended the codecision procedure, now the 
ordinary legislative procedure, to almost all areas of EU law. While the Commission has the 
right of initiative,14 most EU laws are the products of joint decisions by the EP and the 
Council.15 The ordinary legislative procedure is set out in article 249 of the Lisbon Treaty and 
gives equal weight to the EP and the Council of the European Union in many domains, in 
contrast to previous procedures.  
 Initially Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) was a weighted vote system where states 
received an allocation of votes (roughly) proportional to their populations (e.g. France had 29 
votes compared to 10 votes for Austria and 3 for Malta) from a total of 352. QMV required a 
majority of states and at least 260 votes in favor. In November 2014, this changed. The new 
QMV is a departure from previous formulations, replacing the previous weighted voting 
system with a dual majority system. Passage now requires at least 55% of Member States 
representing at least 65% of the EU’s population. In circumstances where the Council doesn’t 
act on a proposal from the Commission, a qualified majority is defined as at least 72% of 
Member Sates representing at least 65% of the EU’s population. Minorities can also block 
legislation if at least 4 member states with at least 35% of EU population are opposed. 
 Together with the ordinary legislative procedure, special legislative procedures govern 
                                                       
14 http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/index_en.htm 
15 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00004/Legislative-powers 
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the production of legislation. While the ordinary legislative procedure is the most commonly 
used legislative procedure today (source: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:ai0016), special legislative procedures (which replace the former 
consultative, cooperation, and assent procedures) typically designate the Council of the EU 
as the sole legislator (relegating the EP to a consultative role).  
Shifts in Legislation 
 
 These changes in how legislation is drafted and approved have increased the number 
of national political actors who have influence on policy (increased not only by the expansion 
of the EU but also by the involvement of the EP and its increased power). Furthermore, the 
domain of EU legislation has expanded from the original coverage of the European Coal and 
Steel Community. The ECSC was initially formed to create a common market for coal, iron 
ore, scrap iron and steel. From this initial agreement, policy domains of agriculture (1962), 
foreign policy, internal markets, and social policy (1992) were included and expanded (source: 
http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/OS/OS15.php).  
Types of Legislation 
 
 Secondary legislation in the European Union consists of Regulations, Directives, 
Decisions Opinions and Recommendations. Of these, both regulations and directives are 
binding, although only the directives carry an additional burden of transposition, as I discuss 
later. For this dissertation, I will focus on regulations and directives, although I recognize the 
importance of decisions, recommendations and opinions. Directives are generally recognized 
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as permitting more discretion to state actors (Franchino 2007, Golub 1999, Windhoff-Héritier 
and Moury 2013) while regulations are often perceived as narrow and less significant in scope 
(Golub 1999). However, this is not always the case as some significant legislation may be 
enacted as a regulation (Windhoff-Héritier and Moury 2013). 
 Regulations and directives are a bit curious in that there are clear distinctions for states 
but more ambiguity in whether legislation should or must be in the form of directive or 
regulation. For states, regulations are immediately binding while directives require states to 
enact legislation (usually of any type—laws, acts, etc.) that fulfills the directive’s mandate. 
Directives are intended to respect the potential heterogeneity of state legal systems as they 
set forth goals and requirements while permitting some discretion. In practice, this discretion 
has varied, decreasing some over time (Windhoff-Héritier and Moury 2013). From the 
perspective of legislative bodies within the EU, the distinction between regulations and 
directives is decidedly less clear as different actors (Commission, Council, European 
Parliament, in co-decision,) have mandates from different bases (Treaties, existing secondary 
legislation) that can be fulfilled at times per the actors’ discretion but other times not (and this 
has changed over time).  
Regulation vs. Directive 
 
 The choice of writing legislation as a regulation or directive is sometimes stipulated in 
the Treaty on the EU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). For example, Article 
46 allows either directives or regulations to be used in ‘bringing about freedom of movement 
for workers (Art 45)’ while Article 59 (trade) discusses only directives and Article 121 
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(economic policy) references regulations. However, other policy domains receive no such 
direction and the choice is left to the actors.  
 Windhoff-Héritier and coauthors explore this topic at length (Windhoff-Héritier and 
Moury 2013), finding that many different considerations likely go into the choice of regulations 
over directives, or vice versa, depending upon the complexity of the policy issue, the policy 
domain itself, whether treaties offer any guidance or stipulations, the need for integration in 
complex national legislative systems (is there existing national legislation that needs to be 
remedied?), among other concerns. (Windhoff-Héritier and Moury 2013) Thus, while Golub 
(1999) argues that regulations are often issued in cases of bulk packages on routine issues 
(such as updating agricultural prices or quotas), this is not necessary true for all regulations. 
Windhoff-Héritier argues, and Golub concedes, that important issues also sometimes make 
their way into legislative force as regulations as well, particularly when states themselves may 
prefer the immediately binding regulation over a low-discretion directive that also requires 
national legislative action. Regulations can provide political cover for states as regulations 
require no state action. However, on average, regulations contain less complex material with 
lower saliency. 
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Figure 1-1: Types of EU Legislation (1967-2012) 
 
 
 Both regulations and directives have come to play an increasingly large role in the 
European Union: although there were fewer than 50 directives in effect in the 1970s, by 2012 
there were 1,989 directives in force (COM 2013). Through this change, the boundary between 
regulations and directives has muddied over time (Windhoff-Héritier and Moury 2013) but the 
bulk of regulations are still more ‘mundane’ compared to most directives.  
 I evaluate directives because the focus of this study is upon how states behave when 
confronted with a deadline and a mandate: do they comply or ignore? Directives require 
states to report compliance and to adhere to the legislation states enacted. Regulations 
require compliance without the reporting and vary widely in content and demands placed 
upon states. A focus upon directives enables a study of how legislative design varies cross 
nationally in ways that are not possible in using only regulations.  
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 Note that while I focus upon directives, I do not delve into specifics of the negotiation 
process that contributes to the design of the final directive. This means that questions of how 
states came to negotiate the drafts that subsequently formed the final directive are not directly 
addressed, aside from the level of (policy-area) ministerial approval. While ministerial 
approval is often similar to the level of state support for the directive, the two are not 
necessarily equivalent (particularly in environments with multiple national political actors). I do 
not address issues of ‘fit’ between the directive and national legislation, aside from in the 
literature review; although this is an issue worth considering in future work. In particular, there 
is a question of the degree to which existing legislation conforms to that within a country—for 
example, in the case of the packaging waste directive and whether the final legislation was 
close enough to that of, say Germany, that Germany might be expected to be compliant 
without significant adaptation of national legislation. Because states negotiate draft EU 
legislation, as I later discuss, all states typically have to adapt or adjust national laws. 
Seemingly small differences between national and EU legislation can contribute to important 
gaps between national laws and that mandated by the directive. It is for these reasons that 
the motivations behind a directive, aside from the national level preferences of policy-area 
ministers, are not explicitly addressed.  
Authorship Trends in Directives Over Time 
 
 Over time, the European Parliament has become more active in legislation—we notice 
a marked increase after Maastricht in 1993 in directives authored by the European 
Parliament. Over the same period, there is a decline in Council directives. Given that the EP 
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does not have sole legislative power, these directives are joint with the Council. These 
directives are more complex, on average, as they involve multiple actors negotiating over 
increasingly diverse policy areas. 
 
Figure 1-2: Directives by Author (EU Institution) (1967-2012) 
 
 
Policy Areas 
 
 From its origins as a community of six member states, the depth and scope of 
European Union legislation have increased quite substantially. To illustrate the different 
domains of legislation covered, I first discuss all legislation and then focus solely upon 
directives, the topic of the dissertation. 
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Figure 1-3: Enacted Legislation by Policy Domain (1967-2012) 
 
 
 The above graph illustrates the share of different policy domains in enacted EU 
legislation. We observe that the largest share is that of Agriculture and Fisheries (47%) with 
Foreign Relations coming in second (15%). These results are not the same when we focus 
solely upon directives. For directives, Agriculture remains a primary policy domain but 
Transport (8.9% of directives vs. 2.7% overall), Social Policy (4.1% of directives vs. 1.3% 
overall) and the Internal Market (41% of directives vs. 9.9% overall) all have a much larger 
share of directives than overall policy.16  
 
                                                       
16 Note the difference in years covered—there are some idiosyncrasies between the two datasets in the periods 
covered. The first dataset comes from Dimiter Toshkov (http://www.dimiter.eu/Eurlex.html) and his 
visualization “55 Years of European Legislation.” The data for directives comes from König and Luig (2014) 
and is described in the data chapter. 
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Figure 1-4: Enacted Directives by Policy Domain (1978-2012) 
 
 
 A second observation is that the bulk of existing research covers Transport (8.9%) or, 
particularly, Social Policy (4.1%) directives. From the above graph, we can see that these two 
policy areas cover a small proportion of directives. Comparatively few studies consider 
agricultural directives while some do focus on Internal Market directives. This topic will be 
revisited in the following chapter. 
Compliance 
 
Compliance refers to whether states meet their obligation of enacting national legislation 
to transpose a directive in a timely and correct fashion. The act of transposition refers to the 
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drafting and enacting compliant national legislation by member states. Member state 
compliance is important for the functioning of the EU. There has been continued research on 
the “transposition deficit”, calculated as the number of in-force directives yet to be transposed 
by member countries relative to the existing body of in-force legislation, and its reduction over 
time. To ensure compliance, the Commission is empowered to check on states during the 
transposition process. Failing to notify the Commission of compliant legislation consumes 
Commission resources during compliance checks. Similarly, failing to properly enact or apply 
legislation is costly for member state constituents who are not able to receive the same 
benefits and rights they are permitted by law, and it is costly for countries that do comply as 
they may be at a disadvantage relative to countries that are not in compliance. For example, 
the estimate of cost to the environment and for health costs of unapplied legislation are 
approximately €50 billion a year. 17,18 Later I discuss the elements of successful transposition, 
but first, I outline the procedure through which infringements are detected and by which they 
are resolved.  
Detecting Non-Compliance: Monitoring and Complaints 
 
The Commission ensures compliance with EU legislation and works to ensure that 
member states are compliant with existing legislation.19 The Commission verifies compliance 
and has the power to initiate infringement proceedings. Commission awareness of 
infringements occurs through Commission checks (focusing upon areas which are prone to 
                                                       
17 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/com_improving.htm 
18 For example, these costs include costs relevant to environmental damage that occurs when countries are in 
violation of an environmental protection. 
19 For further information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/infringements/infringements_en.htm 
 27 
infringement and upon countries which are prone to infringement) and through complaints. 
Interestingly, the Commission is moving away from a complaint-based system toward a more 
active approach to seeking cases of infringement, similar to what has been defined as ‘police 
patrols’ (discussed later)(Commission website, Windhoff-Héritier and Moury 2013). Currently, 
complaints have and continue to represent the majority of substantive infringements. 
Regardless of the origination of the detected non-compliance, once a case of non-compliance 
is detected, the same procedure is followed: letter of formal notice, reasoned opinion, referral 
to the Court of Justice (COJ) and then a decision from the Court.20 
 
Infringement Procedure 
 
Once a possible infringement has been detected through a complaint or the 
Commission’s efforts, the process of information gathering begins. This stage is devoted to 
determining whether a state has infringed on the legislation. The number of open cases under 
investigation has historically been around 2000 cases per year between all the stages of 
infringement proceedings. Before the infringement process formally begins, the Commission 
sends a letter of formal notice. It is the first public stage of what some call the infringement 
process, but technically it is categorized as ‘pre-infringement’. Following this preliminary 
investigation, there are two stages within the formal infringement process, a reasoned opinion 
and referral to the Court of Justice.  
Letter of Formal Notice 
 
                                                       
20 If state non-compliance persists, the Commission can again refer the state to the COJ. 
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In a letter of formal notice, the Commission requests information from a member state 
on the relevant legislation within a certain time frame, typically two months. Information on the 
incidence of formal notices are published in aggregate annually by the Commission but 
typically are not individually publicized unless they are noteworthy, for example if many 
complaints have been brought against a piece of legislation or a member state as the letter 
constitutes part of the ‘pre-infringement’ phase. Typically, the Commission requests additional 
information to clear up confusion about aspects of compliance. This also gives the state an 
opportunity to work toward compliance before formal infringement processes begin. The 
infringement process officially begins when the Commission sends a reasoned opinion. This 
will occur when a state fails to respond to the letter of formal notice, or if it responds in a way 
that is unsatisfactory, either by providing insufficient information or if the information provided 
makes it clear that an infringement has occurred. State failure to resolve these issues leads to 
the Commission to move forward with the process.  
Reasoned Opinion 
 
 A reasoned opinion is much more detailed than the letter of formal notice and opens 
the door to the litigation procedure. It is the first step of the official formal infringement process 
and, like letters of formal notice, is intended to provide an opportunity for states to resolve the 
case as quickly as possible. Reasoned opinions occur when it is clear an infringement has 
occurred, or when a state fails to provide adequate information. They are the final step before 
referral to the court. Court referrals can involve costly sanctions and states have an incentive 
to remedy infringements before the court referral stage is reached. As in the letter of formal 
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notice, states have two months within which they must comply. Between 2005 and 2009, 
approximately 38% of cases moved from letters of formal notice to the Commission issuing a 
reasoned opinion.  
Court Referral 
 
 Once a state has failed to adequately address the Commission’s concerns laid out in 
the reasoned opinion, the state is referred to the Court of Justice. The Commission’s goal is to 
resolve noncompliance before referring to the court, but this goal is not always met. 
Approximately 12% of infringement cases moved from the letter of formal notice to court 
referrals with approximately 33% of reasoned opinions moving to court referrals between 
2005 and 2009. Once referred to the Court of Justice, the Court can side with either the 
member state (and the case is closed) or the Commission (and the state must comply with the 
directive). The Court’s judgment is binding and may include sanctions.  
 These sanctions are can be either flat amounts (referred to as “lump sum”), 
daily/monthly recurring sums (“penalty”) or a combination of each. Recurring sums continue to 
accrue until a state complies.21 Although the Commission can suggest sanction amounts, only 
the Court can set them. Failure to comply can lead to subsequent re-referrals to the Court.  
Infringements 
 
When evaluating the implementation of directives, the Commission distinguishes 
between the different types of failure (official Commission categorization in parenthesis). 
                                                       
21 More on calculation of infringement sanctions here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/infringements/infringements_en.htm 
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Instances in which the directive is applied incorrectly or contradicted by member state 
legislation (“Application”), when the directive is incorrectly written in some way (“Non-
Conformity”), or not enacted within the given deadline (“Non-Communication”). Since 
regulations do not require transposing into national legislation, there is only one infringement 
category for regulation infringements, (“Violation”). This category captures instances of states 
not repealing existing contradictory legislation or enacting further legislation that goes against 
regulation provisions. This yields four technical categories, but I combine them into two 
categories to reflect the type of failure: late and substantive infringements. In the graphs that 
follow, I use data from the disaggregated dataset (state-directive cases) for all infringement 
cases except those with multiple infringement types cited. There are 9,537 total cases with 6 
cases missing information on infringement type and 46 cases with unclear infringement types 
(e.g. The type of violation is cited as ‘2;3’). Rather than include these unclear instances as 
multiple infringement types, they are excluded from the graphs below. Note that they 
represent about 0.00063% and 0.005% of violations, respectively.  
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Figure 1-5: Types of Violations in the EU (1978-1999) 
 
 
  Late infringements are cases in which states have failed to enact legislation by the 
deadline. Substantive infringements are those where states have failed to correctly write or 
apply legislation. Although all infringement types follow the same procedures, how they have 
failed to comply may lead to different outcomes. For example, late infringements are typically 
easier for the Commission to detect than substantive infringements while substantive 
infringements are more commonly reported as complaints. Furthermore, substantive 
infringements may ultimately play a larger role in the degree to which legislation succeeds, as 
these instances can be difficult for the Commission to monitor because states have reported 
that they are compliant, unlike in instances of late transposition. Note that states can have 
multiple infringement cases for the same law: they can have multiple referrals to the Court of 
Justice in the event they do not comply with the initial COJ ruling and they can infringe on 
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legislation in multiple ways.  
 
Non-Communication of Directive Measures (“Late”) 
 
 The most common infringement type is non-communication. During the process of 
transposition, officially incorporating directives into national law, states must notify the 
Commission of the legislation enacted to come into compliance with a directive. Failure to 
notify by the deadline of the directive (most commonly two years) leads to infringement cases 
being opened against the member state. States may enact legislation but fail to notify the 
Commission (as Denmark did in 2014 on the Energy Efficiency Directive)22 but this happens 
rarely. A more typical outcome is a state failing to enact legislation and thus not having 
measures to report to the Commission. This happened in the case of the pregnant workers 
directive when Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal initially 
failed to notify the Commission of relevant transposing legislation because they delayed 
enacting legislation. All states but Luxembourg were able to adopt the relevant legislation 
after the letter of formal notice, before moving to later stages of the infringement process. 
Luxembourg received a reasoned opinion and was eventually referred to the COJ. 
Luxembourg subsequently enacted a law in 1998 to satisfy the directive, four years after the 
1994 deadline. 
                                                       
22 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/13/eu-energy-germany-idUKL6N0QJ2FS20140813 
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Figure 1-6: Late infringements in the EU (By State) (1978-1999) 
 
Non-Conformity Cases of Directive Measures (“Substantive (writing)”) 
 
 These cases are instances where a directive has been partially transposed, but not all 
aspects of the provisions within the directive have been fulfilled by notified legislation. Thus, it 
may be that a state has notified the Commission of measures but that a) the measures 
enacted are not technically correct or b) the entire mandate of the directive is not fulfilled.  
 Although directives do provide considerable flexibility relative to regulations, states do 
not have total freedom: they must adhere to the provisions stipulating what is and is not an 
acceptable requirement in execution of the law. States sometimes fail to correctly write 
legislation, either by failing to address provisions of a directive or by going ‘beyond’ the 
requirements of a directive in placing additional restrictions that limit the intended recipients in 
some way not intended by the original directive. For example, during transposition of the 
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pregnant workers directive (92/85/EEC), Luxembourg illegally imposed additional restrictions 
on pregnant workers. Luxembourg required pregnant women to not only notify their employers 
but to do so by registered mail, to send their employers a medical certificate and to affiliate 
with a social security scheme. For this incorrect writing of legislation, Luxembourg ultimately 
had infringement proceedings opened against it by the Commission, yielding a substantive 
infringement. Luxembourg’s actions placed additional restrictions beyond those identified in 
Article 2, section (a), a “pregnant worker shall mean a pregnant worker who informs her 
employer of her condition, in accordance with national legislation and/or national practice” 
(92/85/EEC).  
 Requiring workers to take the additional steps was not a legally correct interpretation of 
the directive. Italy had infringement proceedings for similar causes: it imposed a ban on night 
work in the manufacturing industry, a prohibition not included or permitted in the directive. 
States may also fail to fully address all the provisions of a directive: France failed to include 
the possibility for pregnant women to be released from work if necessary in order to protect 
their health.23 All three instances were failing to implement the objectives of the directive, 
either as falling short of the goals (France) or by imposing additional restrictions prohibited or 
excluded by the directive (Italy and Luxembourg). These infringements all affected the 
substantive impact of the directive: all workers were not receiving their entitled benefits as laid 
out in the directive text. 
 
                                                       
23 Note that failing to address one provision of a directive is not late IF the state notifies the EU of other 
measures. Meaning, the state must report transposing measures to the EU. If one portion of the directive is not 
covered by the legislation, this is a substantive violation for reason of incorrect writing because the state 
implied it was otherwise in compliance. 
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Figure 1-7: Non-Conformity Infringements in the EU (By State) (1978-1999) 
 
Non-Application (Directives and Regulations) (“Substantive (Application)”) 
 
 There are two types of application-related infringements—one for directives and one for 
regulations—and both involve the same criteria. In both instances, application violations occur 
when states fail to fulfill the legislation they wrote. This may include not applying written 
legislation, failing to repeal existing national legislation that contradicts EU legislation and/or 
subsequently enacting legislation later that contradicts EU legislation. The most common type 
of application violation is a state later enacting legislation that directly contradicts an existing 
directive or regulation, despite the state having enacted compliant legislation. This means that 
a state has legislation that contradicts itself (the new and previous laws) and legislation that 
contradicts a directive (the new law and the text of the directive or regulation). Below I provide 
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examples of instances where substantive infringements occurred for member countries in the 
instances of directives and regulations. The Commission categorizes these infringements 
separately, distinguishing between directives and regulations, but as mentioned above, the 
criteria for each type of infringement is the same and the end result is a substantive 
infringement. 
 
Figure 1-8: Non-Application Infringements in the EU (By State) (1978-1999) 
 
Application (Directives) 
 
 Application of Wastewater Directive (91/271/EC): this directive was intended to provide 
guidance for the protection of water quality in the EU. Two states, France and Greece, were 
applying the directive unevenly, resulting in variable water quality for citizens. The 
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Commission found that both Greece and France failed to comply with European norms. In 
France, initially some 551 small agglomerations (population between 10,000 and 15,000) 
inhabitants were noncompliant with the (correctly transposed) directive. This number was later 
reduced to 54 agglomerations as France worked to consistently apply the requirements for 
water treatment.24 In Greece, 23 agglomerations were also noncompliant.25 In both instances, 
despite legislation mandating the proper procedures, secondary treatment of wastewater was 
not consistently occurring. Thus, despite legislation in force, the legislation was not 
consistently applied to small communities. 
 
Figure 1-9: Non-Application Infringements in the EU (Directives) (By State) (1978-1999) 
 
                                                       
24 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-36_en.htm 
25 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1102_en.htm 
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Violations (Regulations) 
 
 France26 recently enacted legislation permitting a new type of wine made from 
byproducts of distilling (marcs and lees). Member states argue, and the Commission has 
agreed, that this practice violates Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 that pertains to spirit drinks. 
France, after receiving a letter of formal notice stopped the practice relevant to marcs but was 
still permitting distillation-using lees. The Commission sent a reasoned opinion in 2012.27 
 
Figure 1-10: Non-Application (Regulation) Infringements in the EU (By State) (1978-1999) 
 
 
                                                       
26 France had the highest number of infringements of this type during 1978-1999 to it is perhaps not coincidental 
that both examples involve France. 
27 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-179_en.htm?locale=en 
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Infringement Approaches in the Literature 
 
 Approaches to noncompliance have focused upon the degree of noncompliance, 
represented by the relative incidences of infringements to enacted legislation. Over the period 
1978-1999 there is definite variation among member states. For example, Denmark, which 
joined in 1973, has one of the lowest numbers of infringement cases against it while Greece, 
which joined in 1981, has one of the highest numbers of infringement cases.  
 
Figure 1-11: Types of Violations in the EU (By State) (1978-1999) 
 
 
 However, there is also variation in the types of noncompliance by member state, for 
example, the graphic below presents the number of substantive infringement (Incorrect and 
Non-Application infringements) by member states. However, the graph is ordered by the 
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relative number of late infringements. That is, if we anticipate that all types of infringements 
occur for similar reasons, then the relative heights of the bars should then get increasingly 
larger as one moves from left to right. Instead, we see that some factors remain consistent: 
Denmark has few infringements overall while Italy has many. But we also observe that 
Greece has only a moderate number of substantive infringements overall in comparison to 
other states, fewer than Spain, Belgium Germany, and France.  
 
Figure 1-12: Substantive Infringements in the EU (By State) (1978-1999) 
 
Outline 
 
 In the following chapters, I examine the flexibility and specificity of legislation and the 
institutional capacity of the national political actors, including policy-area ministers and 
coalition members, implementing or policing the rules using the lens of European Union 
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member countries and their compliance with EU legislation. The dissertation proceeds in six 
chapters, beginning with this overall introduction to the dissertation, moving through particular 
EU-relevant vocabulary and explanations, and then to the theory. After a discussion of the 
theory, I provide evidence for my theory first generally, and then introducing other elements 
that affect decision-making, including how and when the Commission enforces 
noncompliance. Concluding remarks follow. 
CH2: Literature Review and Theory 
 
 This chapter summarizes the relevant literature in the field, explaining how previous 
analyses have approached the problem and problems they’ve overlooked. In this chapter, I 
highlight why additional research is necessary 
 Transposition has two distinct parts: the decision to initiate the process and 
implementation (drafting and enacting) of legislation. Within each piece, preferences of 
national political actors are influential but only within the limits of the existing institutional 
framework. In the first portion of transposition, the relevant policy-area minister operates 
essentially as a lone veto player: she determines if and when transposition will begin. 
However, once the transposition process is initiated, the policy-area minister loses much of 
her power to other national political actors. It is in the second stage that domestic actors and 
their institutionally endowed rights to shape legislation become salient. Substantive 
infringements arise when three conditions are simultaneously present: the national political 
actors not only disagree with a directive, AND they have the power to affect national 
legislation, AND they have the opportunity to do so, in the national parliament. Late 
infringements arise when only some of these conditions are present: when national political 
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actors disagree but lack tools to substantively influence legislation, e.g. when coalition 
members have weak parliamentary powers but disagree with directive content, or when 
strong national parliaments are involved during the transposition process.   
 Because infringements stem from conflict, analyzing them jointly can seem logical. 
However, the increasing role of parliaments in drafting and transposing directives is likely to 
contribute to higher levels of substantive infringements while appearing to reduce late 
infringements. Approaches that conflate these two types of infringements will miss this 
potential tradeoff. Thus, combining late and substantive infringements will lead researchers to 
not only misunderstand the mechanisms behind these distinct types of infringements, but they 
will conclude that the involvement of parliament will move member states toward greater 
levels of compliance when it potentially indicates the opposite: more opportunities for 
substantive noncompliance, a type of noncompliance that is particularly difficult to detect and 
enforce because it requires the Commission to investigate the substance and application of 
every national measure reported by each member state for each directive.  
 My approach demonstrates that distinguishing between late and substantive 
infringements captures a phenomenon that is likely to increase over time as parliaments 
become increasingly involved in transposition. Furthermore, my analysis provides an 
explanation for why and when late and substantive infringements are likely to occur. 
 Coalition disagreement is able to find its way into the enacted policy by the very nature 
of the process of drafting such measures. Giving disagreeing actors the ability to act on the 
disagreement is at the heart of the parliamentary process as having more members in the 
governing coalition contributes not only to the likelihood of more dissent but also translates 
into the potential for these actors to use the parliamentary arena to act on their disagreement. 
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Governments typically hold majorities in parliament and when coalition partners dislike a 
policy, they may involve the parliament as a means to settle the disagreement. In Chapter 4, I 
find that having more coalition members is positively associated with the involvement of the 
parliament in transposition.  
CH 3: Data on Late and Substantive Infringements  
 
 I make the distinction between late and substantive infringements: cases where states 
are cited for late implementation and cases where states are citied for substantively falling 
short of the directive’s mandate. My distinction between late and substantive infringements 
clarifies our understanding that states may be strategic in when and how they comply. In this 
chapter, I explore why we see some states defying expectations and implementing legislation 
in a timely fashion.  
 Existing research has approached questions of compliance using different sub-
samples of directives, countries and policy domains. Some scholars, notably König and 
coauthors, have worked to provide a systematic evaluation of when states do or do not notify 
measures. However, this is only the first step in implementation. In the second step of 
implementation, enacting legislation, there are different institutional actors involved and 
whose preferences matter. Investigating this second stage enables an understanding of why 
some legislation fails to comply and why these failures are distinct from failures in the first 
stage. 
 In this chapter, I use data from three sources: the Commission on infringements (1978-
1999 (working to extend time period), König and Luig on policy-area minister and partisan 
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preferences (based on Party Manifesto data) (1978-2011), and the Database of Political 
Institutions (via Quality of Governance dataset) (1978-2004). I also incorporate measures of 
parliaments based on data from Martin and Vanberg (2011). 
 
CH 4: Analysis 
 
 In this chapter, I conduct the analysis of the data and models from chapter four. I also 
provide information on the particular effects of the different measures used for my key 
variables of interest—strong parliaments, veto players, and parliamentary involvement. This 
information includes interpretation of the models and information on the marginal effect of the 
variables.  
 In addition, I provide information on alternate specification of the key variables and 
robustness checks on the models and analysis.  
CH 5: Conclusions 
 
 This chapter provides a discussion and summary of the preceding chapters. I 
distinguish between two types of infringements and demonstrate that there are different 
factors contributing to the incidence of late or substantive infringements. Secondly, I provide 
an explanation for the pattern of observed infringements and evidence that substantive 
infringements are likely to be under-detected. This under-detection increases over time 
leading to a systematic under detection and under identification of substantive infringements.  
 Institutions and rules provide a means to coordinate behavior. Failures of or changes to 
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these agreements can tell us about how that coordination may succeed or fail. In the case of 
the European Union, member states failing to follow through on legislative mandates can 
mean that individuals don’t receive pensions as promised, that corporations don’t provide a 
safe workplace for employees, or that there is an uneven playing field for companies in one 
country compared to another with respect to onerous regulations. Furthermore, these failures 
to comply are to agreements that the states themselves help draft. Noncompliance is a 
problem in the EU but is not unique to European Union member states. Compliance issues 
plague agreements more generally at both the international level in treaties and international 
organizations and within states themselves often in the form of bureaucrats implementing 
policy.  
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Chapter II: Factors in Transposition Complications 
 
 The previous chapter introduced European Union-specific terminology and illustrated 
the problem of noncompliance among member states. In this chapter, I explore previous 
explanations for and shortcomings of existing approaches in the literature. I then provide a 
theory to address these shortcomings, which I test in chapter four.  
 Noncompliance is thought to arise from one or a combination of three sources: the 
actors involved, institutions within member states, and features of the directives themselves. 
These components have been addressed throughout the literature, but often by taking only 
one or two of these elements into consideration, not all three. In addition to the different 
factors contributing to noncompliance, measurement of actual noncompliance is not standard 
in the literature. Quantifying transposition outcomes typically involves focusing upon one of 
three compliance indicators: 1) measuring some aspect of timeliness of state transposition 
(are states on time, is there a big delay, are measures notified), 2) tallying the number of 
infringement citations for a country (this might include the stage of infringement proceedings 
reached or the proportion of infringements to legislation per country per year), or, rarely, 3) a 
hybrid approach that considers both timeliness and infringements (for example, looking at 
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cases of delayed implementation or infringement).   
Thus, there are many elements that contribute to noncompliance multiplied by various 
ways to evaluate noncompliance. As a result of these different approaches, expectations are 
difficult to compare across studies. Furthermore, contradictory expectations arise within each 
of these quantifications and, particularly, across them.  
 As we have already observed that late and substantive infringements are only 
imperfectly related, it should perhaps be unsurprising that there are no clear expectations 
regarding how actors, institutions, and directives might affect outcomes. The literature 
operates as though all negative consequences are the same. This conflation comes at a high 
price, particularly as circumstances conducive to substantive infringements are on the rise. To 
understand existing expectations about the roles of these three factors, preferences, veto 
players and institutions, I explore how each of these factors is thought to contribute to poor 
transposition outcomes within the three traditional approaches (timing, infringement, and 
hybrid). I then present a table summarizing these findings, illustrating the contradictory 
expectations arising from previous research. To address these contradictions, a holistic 
approach is needed, one that I develop in the chapters that follow. 
Timing: Delay and Timeliness 
 
 Timeliness of implementing measures is measured either by the degree of delay in 
implementing a measure (time past the deadline) or the total time taken during transposition. 
The length of deadline permitted for implementation is sometimes a function of the difficulty of 
the task at hand, reflecting the need for more intensive policy design (Haverland et al 2011). 
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Studies that focus on time to policy creation from the passage of the legislation (what is often 
termed timeliness in the literature) will unintentionally incorporate this difficulty into their 
measure of compliance as more complex policies will have longer deadlines and will be 
expected to take longer to implement, all else equal, than ‘simpler’ policies with shorter 
deadlines. Secondly, in cases where states are permitted longer deadlines for 
implementation, the likelihood that a state is able to meet the deadline (and thereby have little 
delay, or notified measures after the deadline has passed) is higher. Studies that focus upon 
timeliness will then inadvertently capture elements of policy difficulty while studies that focus 
upon delay may be better able to address questions related to improper implementation. In 
both cases, a focus solely upon policy timing, be it timeliness or delay, still implicitly assume 
that the policy enacted is otherwise desirable and correct. That is, policies that are enacted in 
a shorter time are thought by the literature to be preferable than those enacted in a longer 
time. This approach does not consider the actual enacted policies themselves. 
 Participation of multiple actors in the transposition process, complex directives, 
contentious policy domains and state administrative resources are all thought to increase the 
time needed to incorporate directives into national legislation. Institutional capacity, 
particularly with respect to administrative resources has been demonstrated qualitatively to 
influence transposition (Falkner et al 2005). Finally, there are thought to be different sector-
specific factors that likely increase delays, particularly in domains such as social policy and 
heath and safety (Haverland et al, 2011).  
 
 51 
Preferences 
 
 The preferences of national actors and member states are also thought to affect the 
timing of transposition. These studies often consider the ‘state’ as an actor based on the 
preferences of the government (e.g. Thomson et al (2007)) or they look to particular actors, 
such as the policy-area minister. Still others focus upon the constellation of national actors 
(Steunenberg 2007) to gain an understanding of where upper and lower level (national and 
domestic, for example) actors stand relative to the policy. These differences in measurement 
of preferences certainly also contribute to inconsistencies in findings.  
Two studies find no relationship or negative, but statistically insignificant, relationships 
between preferences and delay (Thomson (2007) and Linos (2007)) while two others find a 
positive and significant relationship between disagreement and delay (König and Luig 2014, 
König and Luetgert (2009)). For timeliness, disagreement is typically associated with a 
decreased likelihood of transposition (Luetgert and Dannwolf (2009), Thomson et al (2007)) 
find a positive relationship.28 Thus, evidence suggests that disagreement by actors with the 
policy, specifically a dislike of the policy by the ‘agent’, however measured, is associated with 
delayed implementation and/or implementation that stalls during transposition. However, while 
some research fails to find support for this, some have found the opposite to be true.  
Veto Players 
 
 The theoretical influence of veto players has appeared to be the cleanest and clearest: 
                                                       
28 However, this effect is not as strong when incorporating only directives that have been transposed and notified 
to the Commission. That is, that when excluding situations in which there is no notification of national 
measures (which are often those with low incentives to deviate) the significance is not as strong. 
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more actors in the process and/or larger distances between the preferences of national actors 
would be associated with poor outcomes (Tsebelis 1995; 1999; 2002). However, support has 
been weak (for example, Mbaye (2001) does not find strong support, although Kaeding (2006) 
does). State and minister preferences have been demonstrated to have a range of different 
associations with poor outcomes. In contrast, the strongest conclusions we can reach about 
veto players is that their effect that is at least not positive (Toshkov 2010). However, the 
expected negative effect of veto players on compliance is, in some circumstances, clearly 
demonstrated to be negative  (Linos (2007), Luetgert and Dannwolf (2009)).  
 Luetgert and Dannwolf use the distance of the national core on a directive’s policy area 
as a means to incorporate disagreement by national veto actors and their influence on 
transposition, where the larger the level of disagreement, the more significantly delayed 
legislation is expected to be. As they expect, they find that the level of conflict among political 
actors about a directive is significantly associated with reduced timeliness in transposition of 
that directive. König and Luetgert (2009) also observe a negative relationship between 
timeliness and conflict in an analysis that considers all national measures (rather than the first 
notified).  
However, unlike previous research that found that more conflict contributed to less 
timeliness (slower transposition), Romeijn (2008) finds an opposite effect: more veto players 
reduce the duration of transposition. Given the clear demonstrated relationship between veto 
players and poor policy outcomes in the broader literature, why would findings for 
transposition be so unclear? This question remains unanswered by existing research. 
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Institutions  
 
 The role of institutions, particularly the involvement of a national parliament in the 
passage of legislation,29 is anticipated to play a significant role in delayed implementation for 
reasons along the line of veto player arguments (more actors contributed to greater delays) 
and because national legislation can be more cumbersome and time-consuming to enact. The 
involvement of a national parliament has been found to be positive (Linos (2007)), 
insignificant (Berglund et al (2006)) or negative and significant (König and Luetgert (2009)30, 
Haverland et al (2011)31). Meanwhile, Borghetto and Franchino find a complex relationship 
between the involvement of a national parliament and the time taken to transpose measures: 
over time, legislative measures move from initial insignificance to speeding implementation 
(Borghetto and Franchino 2010). National parliaments, and parliamentary scrutiny, then may 
have a straightforward effect, they may not, or they may have a nuanced effect with 
transposition. I address this later, but it is likely that these differing results could be explained 
by the nature of transposition: parliamentary measures (and parliamentary involvement) are 
only relevant for notified measures. Thus, the involvement of parliament may appear to speed 
implementation relative to other measures simply because parliaments are not involved in 
measures for which states do not begin transposition.  
 New research by Finke et al (2015) evaluates the involvement of the national 
parliament at two stages in Germany: in the negotiations of a policy and then the 
                                                       
29 When referring to a parliament, unless otherwise noted, I am referring to a national parliament and not the 
European Parliament. 
30 Curiously, the analysis (table 6) reports a negative and significant relationship between share of primary 
legislation and delay but the authors’ explanation states that the relationship is positive and significant. I use 
the relationship established in table 6 by the authors. 
31 They find that ministerial measures are positive and significant with respect to delay. 
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implementation of the same policy. They find that the involvement of parliament prior to a 
directive’s passage, during the drafting stages, slows down discussion but ultimately is 
associated with faster implementation after a directive is passed. Thus, the role of a 
parliament can be to both slow implementation (in the case of information asymmetries) and 
to effectively speed implementation (in the absence of such asymmetries). These results 
certainly provide important insight and motivation for future research. 
 In summary, explanations for delay produce mixed expectations for preferences, weak 
results for the role of veto players, and complicated findings for the role of parliamentary 
scrutiny. While there is evidence in policy analysis to suggest that preferences, actors, and 
institutions matter, consistent findings do not yet support this.  
Substance: Infringements and Violations 
 
 Substantive approaches have focused upon the substance of legislation enacted to 
transpose directives without explicit regard to the time taken during implementation. Scholars 
have studied either the occurrence of infringements (e.g. Börzel et al 2007) or an evaluation 
of the substance of enacted legislation (e.g. Falkner et al 2005). Infringements-based 
approaches are distinct from both qualitative approaches to compliance (such as the smaller 
case studies of Falkner et al 2005) and from timing-based approaches as they are typically-
country focused and as such are unable to incorporate directive-specific features, particularly 
the preferences of national actors or the types of institutions used in the transposition 
process. Approaches that look at noncompliance on a state-directive level tend to do so in 
smaller samples, often focusing upon qualitative case studies of few directives in few member 
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states. Again, the three principal arguments are on the role of preferences, actors, and 
institutions. Both approaches fail to address the questions raised in the timing literature. This 
is because they either look only at states, not directives, or because they focus on a very 
small—and often unrepresentative—subset of a larger phenomenon while leaving many 
unanswered questions regarding substantive noncompliance.  
Preferences 
 
The preferences of national actors and member states are also thought to affect the 
substance of transposition. These studies often consider the ‘state’ as an actor based on the 
preferences of the government (e.g. Thomson et al (2007)) or they look to particular actors, 
such as the policy-area minister. These differences in measurement of preferences certainly 
also contribute to inconsistencies in findings.  
König et al (2012) argue that although directives do not cover the majority of EU 
legislation, they cover the most contested issues. More contested issues, when compared to 
regulations and decisions, means the greater likelihood of divergent preferences.  
 As legal noncompliance is one type of substantive infringement, state preferences 
(coded by Thomson using EU documents and meetings with state representatives) were 
found to be influential in whether a state complied substantively or not. Falkner et al (2007) 
also find that compliance does occur after a member state failed to have its preferences 
incorporated into legislation. However, they attribute the bulk of failures to poor administrative 
capacity and interpretation, rather than disagreement with substance. Furthermore, 
Steunenberg (2007) emphasizes both the necessity of implementation of EU legislation and 
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the role preferences may play in diverging from a directive’s mandate. Disagreement is more 
likely to produce substantive violations given the pressures to comply rather than simply delay 
or inaction (Steunenberg 2007).  
 In short, actor disagreement, typically that of the government, is associated with 
substantive shortcomings, but these findings lie primarily within qualitative studies and have 
not been examined from a large-scale quantitative perspective.  
Veto Players 
 
The preferences of national political actors can further complicate and, often, stymie 
attempts to transpose legislation. However, the expectations and findings within the literature 
are inconsistent: veto players are thought to lead to delay, which could produce late 
infringements as actors block legislation (Borghetto et al, 2006, who also consider whether 
measures are notified (late infringements)), or veto players could force policy compromise 
(Steunenberg 2007). It’s possible that they do both, as Haverland argues in the evaluation of 
the Packaging directive’s transposition across the UK, Germany and the Netherlands 
(Haverland 2000). The number of veto players has not been found to play a consistent role in 
the number or extent of infringements overall (Börzel et al 2007, Mbaye 2001) and some have 
found that more veto players lead to fewer infringements (Börzel, Hofmann, and Sprungk 
2003, cited in Börzel et al 2007 and Borghetto et al 2006)32.  
 In contrast, Giuliani (2003) provides a novel perspective, considering timeliness and 
infringements together (creating a standardize measure of ‘adaptation’ incorporating the 
                                                       
32 This article is available only in German but has been cited by multiple authors in the literature. I’ve also 
consulted with Timm Betz regarding the key findings. 
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number of infringements, at each stage, and relative delay in implementation).33 Giuliani finds 
that veto players are positively and significantly associated with delays and with the number 
of infringements at the member state level, a result that stands in contrast to findings within 
the timing literature as explored above. Jensen’s (2007) work also provides support for 
Giuliani’s findings: more veto players are not only associated with infringements but the stage 
of infringement reached, as illustrated by Giuliani (2003). Thus, veto players are likely to 
contribute to more infringements that are difficult to resolve. This, in turn, supports what 
Tsebelis (1995; 2002) finds: more veto players make policy change more difficult.  
 However, these results are at odds with existing research on substantive infringements 
(Börzel et al 2007, Mbaye 2001), and it is also odd that this strong result exists for 
infringements in the work of Giuliani (2003) but is not found in the timing literature.  
 In short, there are strong theoretical reasons for why veto players are positively 
associated with infringements, but these empirical results are not consistent in the literature. It 
seems, based on quantitative and qualitative work, that veto players are part of national-level 
factors generally associated with transposition difficulties but small samples and different 
categorizations of veto players makes it difficult to reach a consensus. This observation is 
echoed by König and Luetgert (2009). 
Institutions  
 
Substantive infringements have recently become associated with institutional capacities 
of political actors, namely the involvement of the national parliament in transposition. 
                                                       
33 I include Giuliani here, rather than in hybrid approaches, because of his primary focus on infringements rather 
than an explicit distinction between infringements and delay. His index does include elements of infringements 
and delay together.  
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Dörrenbächer et al (2015) undertake a small case study to evaluate how and when 
parliaments are able to shift policy in the case of a controversial directive. They find that 
national parliaments are more likely to be involved in the presence of coalition conflict and 
that “parliamentary scrutiny is attractive to parliaments wanting to change the course of 
implementation of salient EU policies” (pg. 1023, Dörrenbächer et al (2015)).  
 Mastenbroek et al (2014) find that both coalition and opposition members scrutinize 
proposed bills, although they do not consider the substance of amendments or bills relative to 
the directive from a perspective of compliance. While coalition parties do so at a lower rate 
than opposition parties, the interventions of all parties are intended to not only gather 
information but also shape the course of transposition. This latter type of scrutiny is likely to 
occur when issues are particularly salient (Mastenbroek et al 2014). The involvement of 
parliaments is becoming an increasingly important part of the implementation of policies and 
the literature has started to recognize this, although few studies have yet undertaken 
systematic study of the relationship between parliaments and substance within the context of 
infringements and noncompliance.  
Comparative evaluation 
 
 There has been little work done directly comparing timing and substance. Those that 
have contrasted the two have argued that there is a likely a tradeoff between the timing and 
correctness of implementation (Thomson et al 2007, Mastenbroek 2007, König and Mäder 
2013). For example, disagreement with a policy is thought to contribute to both infringements 
and delay. In these studies, scholars have found evidence for a negative relationship between 
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timing delays and infringements (Thomson 2007). The hybrid approaches contrasting timing 
and infringements focus primarily upon the role of preferences in relationship to outcomes and 
do not explore the roles of institutions or veto players.  
Preferences 
 
The negative relationship between delays and infringements is supported by König and 
Mäder (2013), who look at three types of implementation: conformable, partially conformable 
and non-conformable. They suggest that there is a tradeoff between timely implementation 
and the quality of transposition, arguing that in the instance of non-conformable directives 
“…member states seem to follow a ‘quick and dirty’ strategy and notify non-conformable 
measures earlier…” (König and Mäder (2013), p 65).  
 These are valuable insights but they have not yet been evaluated beyond the limited 
dataset used by the authors: both Thomson (2007) and König and Mäder (2013a) focus upon 
highly controversial directives and it is unclear whether or the extent to which the patterns 
they observe apply more broadly. There is reason to believe these cases do not generalize, 
particularly because König and Mäder (2013a) observe few cases of noncompliance (about 
11%),34,35 compared to the 26% rate observed in directives enacted from 1978-1999. 
 In sum, expectations generated by previous research have provided contradictory 
explanations regarding the relationship between key institutional and actor factors in 
transposition. For example, existing research finds that disagreement with a directive may 
                                                       
34 The authors calculate infringement separate from EU infringement cases and report 314 total cases, of which 
279 are conformable, 15 are partially conformable and 20 are non-conformable. (König and Mäder 2013) 
35 Thomson et al (2007) use EU infringement data for these cases and find an infringement rate of 5.3% for the 
dataset.  
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lead to delay (König & Luig 2014) or it may speed implementation but result in an infringement 
(Thomson et al 2007, König & Mäder 2013). Additionally, the relationship between late and 
substantive infringements has not been evaluated jointly except in limited instances. 
Furthermore, research that does consider timing and infringements does not consider the role 
of institutions or other domestic actors, such as veto players, two likely influential factors in 
delay and infringements and looks only at a limited and non-random sample of enacted 
directives. Thus, previous approaches leave many questions unanswered about why, when, 
and how noncompliance emerges.  
Many Questions, Unanswered 
 
 Although these three factors are understood to be significant sources of influence by 
both the literature on EU compliance and in policy change and adaptation more broadly, 
existing studies have failed to reach consistent conclusions regarding the direction and 
magnitude of their influence.  
 The table below illustrates the literature’s different findings regarding the three key 
factors relevant to noncompliance—preferences, veto players, and institutions. The table 
contains the three independent variables, how the dependent variable (often delay or 
infringement) has been operationalized, the studies using that arrangement, and their findings 
(including both sign and significance). A more extensive table, listing the years and policy 
domains of each study, is included in the appendix.  
 What becomes clear in the table is that there have been many approaches to 
understanding compliance that have produced contradictory results, even when attempting to 
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explain the same outcome. The table in the appendix provides some insight into the variations 
of the studies’ approaches, particularly the different samples used in their analysis: for 
example, some include all EU-15 while some include a subset, or only one country; some 
include all policy domains, a small selection, or just one; some include many years while 
others include few. These variations likely contribute to the contradictory findings.  
Table 2.1: Independent and Dependent Variables in the Literature 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Authors  Findings and 
Significance 
 
Preferences 
(Disagreement) 
Delay Thomson (2007) . Not significant 
 Delay Linos (2007) Mixed Not Significant 
 Delay König & Luig (2014), 
König & Luetgert 
(2008) 
+  Significant 
 Infringement Falkner et al (2007) . Not significant 
 Infringement  Thomson et al (2007) + Significant 
 Transposition Luetgert and 
Dannwolf (2009) 
- Significant 
 Timeliness Linos (2007), 
Thomson et al (2007) 
- Not Significant, 
Significant, 
Significant 
 Timeliness and 
correctness 
König & Mäder 
(2013) 
- Significant 
 Violation Steunenberg (2007)   
Veto Players Delay Linos (2007), 
Romeijn (2008), 
Kaeding (2006) 
- Significant 
 Infringement Hofmann, Sprungk 
(2003) 
  
 Infringement Börzel et al (2007), 
Börzel et al (2010), 
Mbaye (2001) 
Mixed Not significant 
 Non-
Transposition 
Toshkov (2007) . Not significant 
 Stage of 
infringement 
procedure 
Jensen (2007) - Not significant 
 Timeliness Steunenberg & - * (depends on 
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Independent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Authors  Findings and 
Significance 
 
Rhinard (2010) model—both 
sig and not), 
Significant 
 Delay Luetgert & Dannwolf 
(2009) 
- Significant 
 Transposition 
Performance 
Giuliani (2003) - Significant 
Institutions: Use 
of parliament / 
type of measure 
Delay Berglund et al (2006) + Not significant 
 Delay Haverland and 
Romeijn (2007) 
. Not Significant 
 Delay Haverland et al 
(2010) 
- Significant 
 Delay Linos (2007) + Significant 
 Time to 
transpose 
Borghetto and 
Franchino (2010) 
- Significant 
 Time to 
Transpose 
Mastenbroek (2003) + Significant 
 Delay Kaeding (2006) - Significant 
 Timeliness König & Luetgert 
(2009), Linos (2007) 
+ Significant*, 
Not Significant 
 Amendment/scru
tiny 
Dörrenbächer et al 
(2014), Mastenbroek 
et al (2014) 
 Case Studies 
 
Three explanations: Samples, Measurement and Infringement Type 
 
 One possible explanation for the different expectations and findings generated by the 
literature could be that different samples contribute to different observations (also noted by 
Luetgert and Dannwolf (2009) and Berglund (2009)). By focusing upon different policy areas, 
countries and/or time periods, our understanding of noncompliance is still incomplete.  
 Secondly, the inconsistency in approaches’ measures of noncompliance may also 
explain conflicting expectations across the three approaches explored: authors vary within 
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literatures on how they quantify these different approaches. For example, timeliness can be 
how many days a measure took to transpose in total (from the adoption of the directive to the 
adoption of the relevant national measure) or the total number of days late a state was in 
transposition (days between the deadline and adoption of relevant measure), or a binary or 
categorical account of ‘lateness’ (late/not, timely/a little late/very late) and these accounts can 
begin from the first notified national measure or the last, or some average thereof.  
 On top of the differences in measures and samples, the conflation of late and 
substantive infringements (in their various forms, as discussed in the previous paragraph) 
further confuses things. Because timing and substance violations occur for different reasons, 
one cannot expect that using a general approach would shed light on the conditions for 
noncompliance.  
An Approach to Understanding Noncompliance 
 
 To address these three problems, I focus upon enacted directives between 1978 and 
1997, the period for which compliance data are most readily available. This period is also prior 
to the expansion of the EU. I exclude the new member states, admitted after 1995, because 
their approach to implementation of national legislation is distinct from their implementation of 
EU legislation.36 Note that this period also includes the UK as a member of the EU. I use a 
standardized measure of noncompliance (infringement proceedings initiated by the European 
Commission).  
                                                       
36 The most recent new member states have had to adopt a large body of EU legislation at once and have 
developed distinct systems for doing so that are separate from how national legislation is handled. I focus 
upon the EU15 because how these states implement EU legislation is more similar to how national legislation 
is implemented. Thus, this study is relevant to the implementation of EU policy and also national policy 
change.  
 64 
I use infringement proceedings, rather than days of delay because infringement 
proceedings provide information for both late and substantive violations standard across 
states. All states are held to the same standard by the same agency. Although there may be 
variation in Commission enforcement across time, states are subject to this variance 
simultaneously. A measure of substantive variation that focuses upon comparisons of the text 
of legislation to the text of the directive would be helpful for one aspect of substantive violation 
(legal correctness), but is not feasible for the body of legislation in force for all fifteen states. 
Secondly, even if such a study were to be undertaken, it would still be difficult to 
independently verify whether the legislation is being enforced, the second aspect of 
substantive compliance, for all fifteen states and approximately 1500 pieces of legislation. 
Commission data, though imperfect, should be consistent for the states as any citizen or 
member state is able to raise concerns about any member state’s failure to comply with 
legislation. This mechanism, commonly termed a ‘fire alarm’ system, will permit many 
infractions to be observed.  
Because states typically use national legislative systems to implement legislation, 
national actors and institutions are particularly important in the implementation process. There 
are three components that determine whether infringements will occur and be late or 
substantive: the preferences of the policy-area minister, the level of intragovernmental conflict 
in the directive domain, and the strength and involvement of the national parliament in the 
passage of the relevant national legislation. Some of these factors have unconditional effects, 
such as the preferences of the policy-area minster while some of these factors have 
conditional effects, such as the involvement of a strong national parliament. There are two 
types of disagreement to consider: disagreement between actors over a policy and 
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disagreement with the policy. Disagreement between actors is when some actors support 
while others oppose the policy. Disagreement with a policy is when actors are united in their 
opposition. Both types of disagreement can contribute to substantive infringements, that is, 
when the substance of legislation falls short of the mandate from the directive. Substantive 
shortcomings are the outcome of different types of disagreement. 
 Below I provide a concise summary of the roles of these three components in shaping 
the implementation process and thereby affecting the probability of delay and/or substantive 
infringement: 
 The policy-area minister, the minister whose assigned portfolio is the relevant domain 
for the directive, is responsible for initiating draft measures at the national level to begin state 
transposition, therefore effectively acts as a state's gatekeeper for the transposition process. 
The minister can initiate the policy implementation process or refrain from doing so. If the 
minister disapproves of the initiatives requirements, s/he declines to act. In making this 
decision, the policy-area minister raises the risk of infringement proceedings for delayed 
implementation. The additional potential advantage for the minister, if s/he expects the 
national parliament and ruling coalition to support the directive, is that she can use her 
gatekeeping power to mute those who prefer the directive to the status quo. Without the 
minister’s decision to initiate draft legislation, coalition and opposition members cannot affect 
the status quo for the directive without extreme measures like banding together to propose 
draft legislation (even still, non-government bills have a very poor success rate). 
 The level of intragovernmental conflict between governing coalition members and the 
policy-
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(or avoid its implementation). In a multiparty government,37 the governing coalition members 
play an important role once measures are initiated, as they impact the final policy. When 
government parties agree with the policy-area minister, and there is a united government, the 
minister's placement of the policy or decision not to act mirrors the policy-area minister's 
preferences. When intragovernmental conflict exists, different players fight to implement the 
policy of their preferences. This, coupled with the strategic incentives for the policy-area 
minister and other government members, leads to different types of infringements. The type of 
infringement depends upon which of the national policy actors support and which oppose the 
directive and on whether these actors have the institutional capacity to act.  
 Policy-area ministers have the institutional capacity to determine whether to initiate 
transposing measures but coalition members with other policy area portfolios on which to 
focus do not. Only when the directive legislation is in the domain of a minister does he or she 
draft measures. In the case of multiple areas being covered by a directive, one minister will 
typically act as ‘lead’ for implementation. As a result, intragovernmental disagreement has a 
conditional effect: coalition members with preferences divergent from the relevant policy-area 
minister can only use their institutional capacity to transform their disagreement into policy if 
the national parliament is strong and involved. Thus, intragovernmental conflict with 
parliamentary involvement can produce substantive infringements or late infringements, or 
both, depending upon whether the policy-area minister has decided to initiate policy or refuse 
to move forward.  
 The table below gives the different outcomes produced by the combinations of these 
                                                       
37 In cases where there is one party in power, preferences are assumed to be in line with those of the policy-area 
minister. Thus, there is supposed to be no intragovernmental conflict in unitary governments.  
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three key factors: policy-area ministers, coalition members, and the national parliament’s 
strength and involvement. In the sections that follow, I provide deeper analysis of these three 
crucial actors, their roles and interactions, explaining precisely why these combinations 
produce these particular expected outcomes.  
 
Table 2.2 Role of Actors and Relationship to Noncompliance 
Actor Preference Parliament Parliament Involved? 
Minister Approves   
Minister Disapproves   
No Conflict Weak No 
Weak Yes 
Strong No 
Strong Yes 
In-Cabinet Conflict Weak No 
Weak Yes 
Strong No 
Strong Yes 
 
(Policy-area) Ministerial Roles 
 
 Given the need to comply with transposition deadlines, member states have 
increasingly moved to expedite the legislative process to avoid late infringements. This has 
shifted more power to the policy-area minister, who is often empowered to push legislation 
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through, given the importance of timely transposition. The ministry has the authority to write 
some measures (ministerial orders) while other measures may additionally require an up-
down vote from the cabinet or legislature.38 Some measures may require full consideration of 
the national parliament, depending upon the type of measure drafted.  
 The policy-area minister does have some say regarding the type of policy drafted, but 
there are two additional constraints on national measures: 1) member states may have 
existing measures that need to be adapted to be brought into line—for example, existing 
legislation on privacy that must be adjusted (as higher-level legislation cannot typically be 
amended or repealed by lower-level instruments) and 2) national laws or conventions may 
dictate the type of legislative measure used (for example, if the federal government does not 
have domain over an area in the constitution, it cannot be transposed at the federal level 
through a delegated measure). Some member states vary—for example, Portugal used to 
require that all legislation go through the national parliament (OECD) and Denmark still uses 
parliamentary review for most legislation (Steunenberg and Voermans (2006)). For the most 
part, however, policy-area ministers have a large amount of power and discretion in 
implementation within member states. Thus, initiating legislation is very often in the domain of 
the relevant policy-area minister and it is this minister whose preferences shape the resulting 
policy (König and Luig 2014). Ministerial approval increases the odds of transposition, 
reducing the potential for late infringement. Although we may observe substantive 
infringements, policy-area ministerial disagreement with a directive will produce delay, 
                                                       
38 While ministries can pass ministerial orders, and these orders can occur fairly frequently (e.g. 40% of 
transposing measures used in Spain), they are typically very limited in scope. For example, they are typically 
used for the transposition of directives that introduce or amend technical norms and standards, such as new 
standards and technical requirements of equipment on board of vessels (pg. 129, Steunenberg and Voermans 
2006).  
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irrespective of the preferences of fellow coalition members.39  
 
Cabinets and Coalition Members 
 
 Once measures are drafted, they typically go to other members of the government for 
approval. Even though there are delegation procedures in place to permit lower-level actors to 
draft and implement legislation, such as policy-area ministers and their offices, such 
permissions come with certain restrictions. Often, these draft measures must be presented to 
the cabinet and/or parliament for an up-down vote (for example, ministerial measures in the 
UK must be accepted by the parliament (Steunenberg and Voermans 2006)). 
 Approximately 63% of coalition cabinets between 1945 and 1999 were based on 
identifiable coalition agreements (Müller & Strøm, 2000). Even when coalition agreements 
exist, EU legislation is not generally included in the coalition agreement (Auer et al 1996) and 
typically only the policy-area minister is involved in negotiating the draft directive at the EU 
level (member states vary in the extent to which parliaments are consulted in the drafting 
(Steunenberg and Voermans 2006)). This means that while cabinet members are often 
involved in national implementation of EU legislation, these same members are often 
excluded from the bargaining at the EU level (although some member states do work to 
consult national interests during the drafting phase, such as Denmark). Thus, there is likely to 
be a tension between the policy-area minister who negotiated the bill and other coalition 
members whose preferences were not incorporated in the policy design. How this tension, 
                                                       
39 There are circumstances in which ministers may choose to enact or report disliked policies quickly. This point 
is addressed in the following section. 
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particularly disagreement between coalition members and the policy-area minister, plays out 
depends upon the institutional capacity of coalition members to shift policy and ministerial 
reaction to that capacity. 
National Parliamentary Power and Constraints 
 
 In addition to the preferences of actors, the power of domestic political actors to 
incorporate their preferences into policy affects whether the type of infringement observed will 
be late or substantive when the national parliament is involved. Actors in the political process 
have institutional powers to act on their incentives to affect the content of bills. These powers 
relate to the ability of actors to shape draft bills though amendment, the procedure of debate, 
and how bills move through the drafting process. The rules for these bills can favor the 
governing coalition by limiting debate, restricting information access with ad hoc, rather than 
permanent, committees, and allowing the government to have final amendment rights. Rules 
can limit the governing coalition by permitting broad amendment by political actors and by 
constraining the governing coalition’s ability to ‘fast track’ bills (‘fast track’ measures also often 
limit debate). Increased parliamentary power, in the presence of political conflict, can allow 
actors to shift legislative bills closer to their own ideal points. Decreased political power, even 
in the face of conflict, can restrain actors and constrain the policy domain to that of the 
directive, reducing the potential for substantive infringement. 
 Stronger national government control over legislation corresponds to stronger tools to 
keep coalition partners in line (Franchino and Høyland 2009). Weaker national government 
control (and thus, stronger national parliamentary institutions) reduces the potential to police 
or rein in fellow coalition members, thereby increasing the potential for these actors to act on 
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their preferences. Weaker government and stronger parliaments coincide from the 
perspective of institutional powers. While it is possible that no one has any particular power, 
often there are a certain set of institutional capacities including the ability to amend legislation, 
the formation of committees, the ability to shape discussion, and the ability to have final say 
over amendments, for example. These abilities belong to the institutional players. The more of 
these powers that belong to the government, the stronger the government’s control of the 
agenda. In contrast, the weaker the government, meaning the fewer of these powers the 
government has, the stronger the parliament. Stronger parliaments are associated with more 
substantive and more late infringements in the presence of coalition conflict because they 
provide the potential for policy changes and these changes take time.40  
Expected Outcomes 
 
 I now turn to the outcomes expected by the combinations of the three factors for 
infringements (policy-area ministers, coalition preferences and national parliaments). Note 
that I have argued that the minister acts as an additive effect to the transposition outcome; he 
or she adds the potential for late infringements to the outcome to the second component of 
the transposition process, the enactment of measures by national political actors. These 
national actors contribute to compliance, late infringement or substantive infringement based 
on the amount of in-coalition disagreement, the strength of the national parliament and the 
involvement of the national parliament in passing legislation. In sum, there are ten scenarios 
to evaluate: whether the minister approves or not, and then the combination of whether the 
                                                       
40 It is possible that coalition members can threaten to involve parliament if certain concessions are not made to 
a policy. However, it is also possible that these threats will be ineffective, resulting in delays but no substantive 
infringement. It is for this reason that strong parliaments are associated with increased infringements but the 
involvement of parliament is relevant to whether the infringement will be late or substantive.  
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parliament is involved or not, if the parliament is strong or not, and if there is in-cabinet conflict 
or not. I expand upon these elements below, highlighting those most salient to the theory. The 
key element to understand is how these crucial components combine to provide a fertile 
ground for late or substantive noncompliance. 
 
Ministerial Approval and Disapproval 
 
When a minister approves of the measure, he or she will work to initiate draft 
measures. When the minister does not approve of the measure, she or he will not initiate draft 
measures. This is because inaction is easier than action: if a minister does not like a 
measure, there is a risk that enacting any measure, even a non-compliant one, will move the 
minister further from his or her ideal point. Thus, in cases in which a minister disagrees, his or 
her first preferred move is to maintain the status quo.  
Dissatisfied coalition members may press for substantive changes but, without the 
involvement of the parliament, such disapproval is likely to amount in delay as well. For these 
reasons, late infringements are anticipated in this scenario.41 These conditions produced a 
situation in which a late infringement was observed during the German implementation of the 
Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC): the policy-area minister was opposed to the directive 
and not even the strong support by fellow coalition members could induce the policy-area 
minister to initiate transposition.  
                                                       
41 It is possible that coalition members can threaten to involve parliament if certain concessions are not made to 
a policy. However, it is also possible that these threats will be ineffective, resulting in delays but no substantive 
infringement. It is for this reason that strong parliaments are associated with increased infringements but the 
involvement of parliament is relevant to whether the infringement will be late or substantive.  
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Strong National Parliament and In-Cabinet Conflict 
 
In this scenario, the presence of a strong national parliament and multiple veto players 
means that actors have a potential for disagreements to exist and a strong institutional 
structure to leverage their policy disagreements. Coalition conflict provides an incentive for 
actors to try to change proposed national measures. To successfully affect the substance of 
legislation, a state’s cabinet members need the ability to gather information about the 
proposed measure (typically through committee membership in stable committee structures) 
and the institutional capacity to amend legislation. Without the involvement of the national 
parliament, cabinet members can delay the measures at best, although they may have no 
effect on the measures because they have no institutional power to do so. Thus, in this 
scenario, late infringement is most likely. 
 
Strong and Involved National Parliament 
 
The involvement of a strong national parliament provides the opportunity for 
parliamentary scrutiny of actors. Even in the absence of actor disagreement, the involvement 
of a strong institution can contribute to higher-than-average numbers of late infringements 
because legislative measures must go through multiple stages of parliamentary review, 
including evaluation and consideration by multiple committees. Thus, in this scenario, late 
infringement is expected to occur. 
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In-Cabinet Conflict and Involved (Weak) National Parliament 
 
With the involvement of the national parliament and the presence of in-cabinet conflict, 
political actors have the possibility to affect the substance and path of legislation. However, 
because the parliament is weak, parliamentary actors do not have the ability to amend bills, or 
the government has the right to curtail debate, for example, As a result, despite these actors 
having the preference to adjust or amend considered legislation, they do not have the 
institutional capacity to do so. In these scenarios, late infringements are expected, rather than 
substantive, because the best coalition members can do is a delay of the bill.   
 
In-Cabinet Conflict and Strong, Involved National Parliament  
 
In-cabinet conflict provides an incentive for actors to try to change proposed national 
measures. The involvement of a strong parliament provides the opportunity for coalition (and 
opposition) members to act on this disagreement and substantively affect policy. Thus, in this 
scenario, substantive infringement is most likely. 
 Germany’s work to implement the packaging directive provides an example of this 
scenario: because Germany has a strong upper chamber, parties not included in the 
government are able to exercise influence over draft legislation, as in the case of the 
opposition’s power in the Bundesrat. These actors are veto players not in the governing 
coalition and are typically not included in drafting legislation or in coalition agreements.  
In the context of the 1991 Packaging directive (91/441/EEC), authored by the Council, 
the German government worked to draft legislation that would reduce the quota for drinks sold 
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in refillable containers. Local business favored the high quota because it indirectly favored 
national producers over foreign companies. The German government, a coalition of Christian 
Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP), faced a strong opposition, the 
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDP). Because both chambers must consent to 
legislation and the directive was sufficiently complex, there were many points of disagreement 
among actors but also points of compromise. The opposition was able to use its power in the 
Bundesrat, where it held a majority, to veto the government’s proposal, forcing compromise 
on the final quota set. Germany ultimately faced infringement proceedings for the substance 
of the enacted legislation (Haverland 2000). In this case, the strong national parliament’s 
involvement enabled national actors to shift the substance of the enacted measure away from 
that of the directive and closer toward the actors’ preferences. 
 
Remaining Scenarios 
Remaining scenarios are those in which there is no conflict but national parliamentary 
involvement of (1) a weak national parliament or (2) a strong national parliament, when there 
is conflict but no (weak) parliamentary involvement, or when there is no conflict and no 
parliamentary involvement but the parliament is strong. These scenarios may be associated 
with infringements, but if they are, it will be because a) these measures may be time 
consuming to enact (parliamentary/legislative measures can be time-consuming to enact) 
and/or b) because there are external factors that are either capacity-specific (such as having 
an effective bureaucracy) or directive-specific (a complex or lengthy directive).   
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Expectations 
 
The above arguments generate the three following expectations:  
1. Approval by the policy-area minister will be negatively associated with late 
infringements. 
2. Late infringements are also likely to arise when there exists conflict amongst actors 
and no institutional opportunities to voice that disagreement, specifically: 
a. Strong National Parliament x National Parliament involved 
b. In-coalition Conflict x (any) National Parliament involved 
c. In-coalition Conflict x Strong National Parliament 
3. Substantive infringements are likely to arise when there exist disagreements among 
coalition members and strong national parliamentary institutions that are also involved 
in legislating. 
First Look: Comparisons 
 
Before turning to the statistical analysis, I first conduct tests on the conditions laid out 
in the arguments above. We can see the ten cases from before with two possible outcomes: 
late or substantive infringement. I separate the minister’s approval or disapproval as a distinct 
additive portion. From there, there are the eight distinct cases that combine the level of in-
cabinet conflict, strength of the national parliament and the involvement of the national 
parliament. The major predictions of the theory presented above are labeled and bolded in the 
respective column. I then highlight the cell with the appropriate color (green) to indicate if the 
theory has been proven correct. Red indicates incorrect).  
As the table below shows, the theory correctly predicts five of the six scenarios outlined 
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by the theory. The case that the theory fails to predict correctly - that of in-cabinet conflict and 
a strong, but uninvolved parliament - could occur because the delays are smaller here 
compared to other cases. It could also be that the theory is incorrect or that there are other 
factors affecting the circumstances.  
Although not highlighted in the table, I also tested the ‘remaining cases’ together to 
determine whether they have higher or lower levels of late infringements than those predicted 
to be late. I find that the theory is also correct here: these cases do have significantly fewer 
late infringements. Similarly, when comparing the instance in which substantive infringements 
are expected to the body of cases in which substantive infringements are not expected, the 
results are as anticipated: substantive infringements are much more likely to occur in the 
scenario expected than in the other cases jointly.  
Table 2.3: Evaluating the Hypotheses42 
Actor Preference Parliament Parliament 
Involved? 
Late Sub 
Minister Approves   No  
Minister Disapproves   Yes  
No Conflict 
Weak No No 
No 
No 
No 
Weak Yes 
Strong No 
Strong Yes Yes 
In-Cabinet Conflict 
Weak No No 
Weak Yes Yes 
Strong No Yes 
                                                       
42 Note that that table has late and substantive infringements in reversed order to the statistical analysis in 
chapter four. This is because for the purposes of explanation, late infringements seem more familiar and are 
more often discussed in the literature. However, the explanation of substantive infringements is a significant 
contribution of the dissertation and so it is presented first in the analysis. 
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Strong Yes No  Yes 
 
 
On the whole, the theory performs very well in these initial tests, providing strong 
support for my arguments. I also evaluate these arguments in chapter four with a statistical 
model.  
Additional Factors 
 
In addition to the arguments presented above, certain elements of a directive’s design 
are anticipated to affect a state’s compliance. These factors are very important but have a 
higher level of consensus about them in the literature than the actor and institutional 
components in the previous section. For this reason, their discussion is concise.  
Directives 
 
 In addition to the actors and institutions involved in the process, certain features of 
directives themselves have been identified as contributing to difficulties in the transposition 
process. They include the complexity of the directive, the policy area of the directive, and the 
amount of discretion permitted to state actors in implementing that directive. I detail these 
below.  
 Legislation complexity, typically referring to issues that touch on many topics or require 
a high amount of technical knowledge or skill to execute, have been demonstrated to 
negatively affect timely compliance. Complexity has alternately been measured as the length 
of recitals on a directive (Kaeding 2007), the number of issues covered (König and Luig 2014, 
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Franchino 2004). When topics are more complex, they may be more difficult for states to 
implement but they may also offer more discretion to states in the implementation process in 
recognition of their complexity (Franchino 2004). Previous work has determined that more 
complex directives can be associated with delayed implementation as granting discretion can 
permit states more freedom in implementing but lead to delays as states interpret the directive 
(Thomson et al 2007).  
 Directive length can increase implementation burdens for member states. Long and/or 
detailed directives can require more of states as they move to enact compliant legislation 
because these pieces of legislation may provide many restrictions that may be difficult for 
states to satisfy (Kaeding 2006). These concerns a bit more ambiguous as length is not 
always a clear indicator of the detail or requirements contained within legislation.  
For example, a statement may outline items that are not possible or those that are 
possible in the same number of words. Despite taking the same number of pages, the second 
may prove more restrictive. Thus, while this measure is included as an additional proxy in the 
literature and analysis, what it measures is not entirely clear. As Steunenberg and Rhinard 
(2010) point out, there also may be additional annexes (appendices) in more technically 
complicated measures that consume additional pages that do not contribute directly and, if 
anything reduce, the level of overall difficulty in transposing the legislation. The effect of 
increased detail is thought to increase delay because states may not have other avenues for 
the disagreement with a directive and potentially influence the number of infringements as 
these directives may be more prone to conflict within coalitions (König and Luig 2014).  
 Discretion itself is also measured in individual directives. The discretion permitted to 
member states has two sides: when more discretion is granted, it may be more likely for 
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states to enact compliant legislation as they are better able to adapt the directive 
requirements to conform to national legislation. At the same time, more discretion can often 
mean more ambiguity for states, increasing the difficulty of enacting complaint legislation, as 
Toshkov and Steunenberg find (2009). There are different measures for discretion, including 
the ratio of provisions granting autonomy to states relative to the number of provisions overall 
(Franchino 2004), or whether the Council or Commission initiated the directive (Council 
directives typically permit more discretion to states). Discretion has been associated with 
increased delays (Mastenbroek 2003). However, the relationship between discretion and 
infringements is unclear: discretion may enable better compliance because states have more 
latitude to adjust the directive to national systems or the directive may prove to ambiguous for 
states to properly implement.  
Policy Area 
 
 Finally, the policy domain of different directives is thought to be influential in how states 
transpose measures. The significance of policy domains pertains both to the topic area itself 
and addresses potential differences in how legislation regulates. For the former, different 
domains may have different levels of public salience or interest: social policies, such as those 
on worker rights, and environmental directives are frequently more salient than many 
agriculture policies.43 Furthermore, the types of directives in different policy domains may 
have different scopes, with some being far-reaching whiles others more ‘mundane’.  The 
                                                       
43 However, not all agriculture policies are uninteresting. For example, in 2009 protests farmers and protesters 
upset over failing milk prices (linked to EU agriculture policies and milk quotas) “poured milk onto the streets, 
hurled eggs and other missiles, and started fires that filled the air with black smoke.”  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/business/global/06milk.html?_r=0 
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salience of these directives can also be tied to whether the directive, or modal directive of that 
policy type, is redistributive or regulative. Redistributive policies are akin to zero sum games 
in that there are winners and losers. These types of policies an create higher-profile 
disagreements among member states as some individuals are likely to be advantaged at the 
expense of others, for example when regulating how to label and manufacture different 
chocolates. This debate may seem inconsequential, but can shift trade from one country’s 
producers to another. The requirements for labeling of different chocolates, with differing 
levels of cocoa solids, can permit some states to label ‘chocolate’ what a rival state (such as 
Belgium) would label as an ‘inferior’ product. Thus, states would be able to compete for 
consumers using a ‘higher prestige’ nomenclature under some permission for chocolate 
production, often at the expense of existing producers.  
In contrast, regulative polices are often about coordinating measures to ensure even 
treatment. In these scenarios, something like driving on the same side of the road across all 
member states (unregulated by EU directives) or the appropriate size and placement of 
tractor mirrors (regulated by EU directives and regulations, ex: directive 32009L0059). Here, 
there aren’t winners and losers in the same sense as in redistributive policies, although there 
may be some advantages for some states, companies, or individuals.  
 Different policy domains feature different mixtures of these policy types. This mixture, 
in combination with relative salience for an issue can contribute to challenges in 
implementation, both because national actors may be more divisive on an issue and because 
the issue at hand will be more relevant. Finally, it may also be that different directive domains 
are more technical or require different levels of expertise to implement. Thus certain domains, 
such as telecommunications, will require longer deadlines and may incur more delay. This 
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argument is difficult to evaluate empirically without individual coding of each directive and 
member states’ enacting legislation, but seems to be supported by Haverland et al (2011) 
who find stark differences across policy sectors in compliance rates. In particular, while many 
policies are enacted late, those suffering from particular lateness are those that may require 
more change in social and economic systems, such as directives on Health and Safety. 
 In short, there are domain-specific factors that can speed or slow transposition and that 
make infringements more likely. Accounting for different domains in the overall analysis is a 
first step toward addressing these factors although I do not develop specific hypotheses in 
this dissertation.  
This chapter provided an overview of existing approaches to member state compliance 
and developed a theory of member state noncompliance. I demonstrated the importance of 
distinguishing between late and substantive infringements, particularly focusing upon the 
mechanisms contributing to the incidence of late infringements or substantive infringements. 
This theoretical discussion produced a series of expectations regarding the circumstances 
under which either late and/or substantive infringement might arise. Before evaluating these 
hypotheses in chapter five, I first provide an overview of the available data on noncompliance 
in the next chapter. I then explain for the best means of evaluating these hypotheses, 
exploring different means of modeling state noncompliance.    
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Appendix: Summary of literatures 
Table 2.4: Preferences (Disagreement) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Authors  Countries 
(Years) 
Policy 
Sectors 
Findings and 
Significance 
  
Delay König & Luig 
(2014) 
1978-2009 All +  Significant 
Delay Linos (2007) EU-12 (1985-
2000) 
Social Policy mixed Not 
Significant 
Delay Thomson (2007) EU-15 (1991-
2004) 
Social Policy . Not 
significant 
Infringement  Thomson et al 
(2007) 
EU-15 (1999-
2006) 
6 Dirs +  Significant 
Time to 
Transpose 
Luetgert and 
Dannwolf (2009) 
BE, DK, FR, 
DE, EL, IT, 
LU, NL, SP 
(1986-2003) 
All - Significant 
Timeliness Linos (2007) EU-12 (1985-
2000) 
Social Policy mixed Mixed 
Delay König & Luetgert 
(2009) 
EU-15 (1986-
2002) 
All + Significant 
Timeliness Thomson et al 
(2007) 
EU-15 (1999-
2006) 
6 Dirs - Significant 
Timeliness König & Mäder 
(2013) 
EU-15 (2001-
2007) 
All 
(*contentiou
s) 
+ Significant 
Violation Falkner et al 
(2007) 
EU-15 (6 
dirs) 
Social Policy . Not 
significant 
Violation Steunenberg 
(2007) 
NL (2 dirs) Health, 
Agriculture 
 (case 
studies) 
Correctness König & Mäder 
(2013) 
EU-15 (2001-
2007) 
All 
(*contentiou
s) 
- Significant 
 
Table 2.5: Veto Players 
Dependent 
Variable 
Authors  Countries 
(Years) 
Policy 
Sectors 
Findings and 
Significance 
 
 88 
Delay Linos (2007) EU-12 (1985-
2000) 
Social Policy - Significant 
Infringement Börzel et al (2007) EU-15 (1978-
1999) 
All . Not 
significant 
Infringement Börzel et al (2010) EU-15 (1978-
1999) 
All mixed Not 
significant  
Infringement Börzel , Hofmann, 
Sprungk (2003) 
EU-15 (1978-
1999) 
All - Significant 
Infringement 
(rate)  
Mbaye (2001) EU-15 (no 
Greece, 
1972-1993) 
All . Not 
Significant 
Non-
Transpositions 
Toshkov (2007) NMS (1998-
2005) 
Social Policy . Not 
significant 
Stage of 
infringement 
procedure 
Jensen (2007) EU-15 (1978-
2000) 
Social Policy - Not 
significant 
Delay (0/1) Kaeding (2006) DE, EL, NL, 
ES, UK 
(1957-2004) 
Transport - Significant 
Transposition 
Performance 
Giuliani (2003) EU-15 (1986-
2000) 
All - Significant 
Transposition 
Time 
Steunenberg & 
Rhinard (2010) 
DE, EL, NL, 
ES, UK 
(1978-2002) 
Food, Social 
Policy, 
Transport 
- Significant 
 
Table 2.6: Institutions: Use of parliament / type of measure 
Dependent 
Variable 
Authors  Countries 
(Years) 
Policy 
Sectors 
Findings and 
Significance 
  
Delay Berglund et al 
(2006) 
DE, EL, NL, 
ES, UK 
(1986-1999) 
Utilities, 
Food Safety 
+ Not significant 
Delay Haverland and 
Romeijn (2007) 
DE, EL, NL, 
ES, UK 
(1975-1999) 
Social Policy . Not Significant 
Delay Haverland et al 
(2011) 
DE, EL, NL, 
SP, UK 
(1978-2002) 
Agriculture, 
Energy, 
Food, Health 
and Safety, 
Road 
Transport, 
Shipping, 
- Significant 
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Social 
Policy, 
Telecom 
Delay Linos (2007) EU-12 (1985-
2000) 
Social Policy + Significant 
Time to 
transpose 
Borghetto and 
Franchino (2010) 
EU-15 (1978-
2004) 
(random 
selection) 
All  - Significant 
Time to 
Transpose 
Mastenbroek 
(2003) 
NL (1995-
1998) 
All + Significant 
Delay (0/1) Kaeding (2006) DE, EL, NL, 
ES, UK 
(1957, 2004) 
Transport + Significant 
Timeliness König & Luetgert 
(2009) 
EU-15 (1986-
2002) 
All - Significant 
Timeliness Linos (2007) EU-12 (1985-
2000) 
Social Policy + Not significant 
Amendment Dörrenbacher et al 
(2014) 
AT, DE, FR, 
NL (1 dir) 
Justice  (case study) 
Scrutiny Mastenbroek et al 
(2014)  
NL (2 dirs) Social  (case study) 
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Chapter III: Data and Model Framework 
 So far, I have explored significant themes in understanding noncompliance. I then 
developed a theory to explain the origin of noncompliance among member states. In this 
chapter, I explain the dataset in greater detail and include information about model design and 
selection. I also provide information on the variables to be used, their source and 
operationalization, and descriptive statistics. This chapter describes and provides a 
framework to test the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. I first discuss the data, 
how these data are combined to test my hypotheses and then move to explaining the model I 
use to test the data.  
Data 
 
 I use data from two sources: Commission Data (via Börzel et al (2010)) and directive-
level data (König and Luig (2014)). These two datasets enable detailed study of 
noncompliance. The Börzel data cover all infringement cases reaching at least the stage of 
Reasoned Opinion (the first public stage) for all secondary legislative acts from 1978 to 1999, 
although I limit the years of directives from 1978-1997 to reflect the delay between directive 
deadlines and detection of infringements. These data encompass over 9000 infringement 
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cases pertaining to directives and regulations.  
 I use data from König and Luig (2014) to explore directive-level details and the degree 
of approval by the policy-area minister. However, using the infringement and König and Luig 
data together does reduce the overall sample of infringement cases as the infringement data 
only go through 1999. Part of the reduction comes from König and Luig’s focus solely on 
directives and exclusion of regulations. In the preliminary analysis that follows, I focus upon 
directives, in part because the majority of the literature has focused upon directives, typically 
from the perspective of explaining delays during the transposition process. These data cover 
1490 directives, of which 998 directives have at least one infringement case opened on them. 
The number of member state observations per directive vary, as state-directive observations 
are only included when they occur during a state’s membership in the EU (e.g., Greece is not 
included on directives written prior to 1981). 
 Infringement data come from the European Commission via Börzel et al (2010). The 
data are at the state-infringement case level and often include citations for multiple directives 
for substantive infringements. I explain how infringements are calculated in the following 
section. The data have been reformatted such that each directive cited for late (‘non-
notification’) or substantive (‘incorrect’ or ‘non-application’) infringement is included in the 
dataset. Infringements on regulations, a substantial portion of the data, are not included in the 
dataset. For reasons listed above, only directives from 1978-1997 are included in the dataset. 
There are 3,656 infringement cases, of which 812 are substantive infringements.  
Dataset Creation 
 
 The two datasets are combined such that three variables—infringement, late 
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infringement, and substantive infringement—note whether an infringement, late infringement 
and/or substantive infringement are observed. There are three consequences of this 
combination: multiple infringement citations for the same cause are reduced to one instance, 
multiple infringement citations for different causes are affected and citations for multiple 
directives in the same infringement case are included for each directive mentioned.  
Multiple Cases 
 
 When a state is cited multiple times for the same directive, for example, if substantive 
infringement proceedings are brought against the state fewer than two different infringement 
case numbers, this is recorded as a substantive infringement. I also tally the number of 
infringement cases brought against a state for a particular directive, but the analysis in the 
following chapter focuses only upon whether a late or substantive infringement exists, not the 
severity of infringement. I also count instances of whether an infringement occurs or not. Even 
in instances where a state is cited multiple times, this registers as having an infringement 
occurred.  
 I focus only upon the incidence of infringement, rather than the repeated occurrence of 
infringements, because understanding the incidence of infringements is important prior to 
understanding why some infringements occur repeatedly. 
Multiple Infringement Types 
 
 States are sometimes cited for both late and, later, substantive infringements. In my 
analysis, both the late and substantive infringement is recorded for the directive. As before, 
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once an infringement case is opened against a state on a directive, the ‘infringe_not’ variable 
(recording whether infringements occur) is set to 1.  
 It is important for my analysis to record whether an infringement occurs, or not, and the 
type of infringement(s) that occur. As with multiple cases of infringements, I do not focus upon 
severity or repeat occurrences in this research and, as such, the maximum value for each of 
the infringement, late, and substantive variables is 1.  
Infringements Spanning Multiple Directives 
 
 Some infringement cases, typically for substantive infringement, cite multiple directives. 
For example, infringement case 1998/2329 cites three directives for substantive infringement: 
31991L0156; 31991L0689; 31994L0062. For each of these directives, a substantive 
infringement is recorded for the cited member state, Italy. 
 Often when a state is in substantive violation of a directive, their misbehavior affects 
multiple directives in similar domains (this often occurs with environmental directive) or a new 
directive has superseded the original directive during the course of infringement proceedings. 
I include all directives mentioned in the infringement proceedings because all directives have 
been substantively infringed by the state. Citing multiple infringements in one case, rather 
than opening separate cases for each directive reduces the administrative burden on the 
Commission when investigating possible infringement.  
 In the case of the three directives cited above in case 1998/2329, for example, they all 
have to do with waste.44 Thus, Italy’s violation affects the three directives and each directive 
                                                       
44 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 18 March 1991 amending Directive 75/442/EEC on waste (91/156/EEC), Council 
Directive 91/689/EEC of 12 December 1991 on hazardous waste, European Parliament and Council Directive 
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should have a substantive violation recorded for it. To address the potential that splitting 
multiple citations into separate cases creates additional data points, I conduct additional 
robustness tests in the following chapter.  
Variables 
 
 There are a number of different variables included in the analysis, pertaining to 
preferences, actors, institutions, and directives. I first provide descriptions of the 
operationalization of each of the variables and then follow with a table of descriptive statistics 
of the variables. The name of the variable from the analysis appears first, followed by a longer 
description in parentheses). 
 Infringe_not (Infringement present): Whether an infringement occurred (1) or not (0). 
Source: own calculations using data from Börzel et al (2010) 
 Sub_not (Substantive infringement): Whether a substantive infringement occurred 
(1) or not (0). Source: own calculations using data from Börzel et al (2010) 
 Late_not (Late infringement): Whether a late infringement occurred (1) or not (0) 
Prior Whether a state reported legislation in transposition that was enacted prior to the 
deadline for the directive (1) or not (0) Source: own calculations using data from Börzel et al 
(2010) 
 Approval (Policy-area Ministerial Approval): the distance between the ideal point of 
the relevant transposing minister in the policy domain and the Council of Ministers on that 
domain. The national party government position is used to estimate the length of the EU core 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
94/62/EC of 20 December 1994 on packaging and packaging waste 
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as the maximum ideological distance between negotiating member-state governments (König 
and Luetgert 2009) with the assumption that the final directive will lie in the Council core 
(König and Luig 2014). Ministerial approval is measured as the shortest distance between the 
policy-area minister’s party’s45 ideal point and the boundaries of the EU core. Positive values 
reflect preferences within the EU core and negative values reflect preferences further from the 
core.  This variable comes from estimation using party manifesto data. Source: König and 
Luig 2014 
 Strong (Parliamentary strength): Categorical variable from 0 to 4 (strongest). This is 
a variable to reflect the strength of national parliamentary institutions in comparison to the 
government. The involvement of the national parliament is thought to protect against 
ministerial drift (Martin and Vanberg 2005, Franchino and Høyland 2009) as the legislature 
may be able to affect the substance of enacted legislation (Dörrenbächer, Mastenbroek and 
Toshkov 2015, Haverland 2000), pulling or pushing the final content from the text of the 
directive. However, this depends upon whether the national parliament is able to affect the 
substance of debate (Martin and Vanberg 2011). This variable combines four elements of 
national parliamentary power: the ability to rewrite bills, if the government cannot truncate 
debate, whether the government cannot mark bills as ‘urgent’ to expedite the process, and 
whether extensive committees exist (numbering more than the average number of 
committees within states). These measures were selected for their ability to empower the 
national parliament to scrutinize bills and gather their own information. Their selection is 
informed by factor analysis undertaken by Martin and Vanberg in their analysis of the core 
                                                       
45 This is an important distinction that I don’t develop here. The minister is assumed to have strong party 
allegiance, implementing a policy corresponding to his or her party’s preferences (acting as a faithful agent of 
his/her party).  
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elements of a strong national parliament. Source: Martin and Vanberg (2011)46 
 Alternate measure:47 Agenda_rev (Agenda Control): Agenda control reflects the 
relative power between the government and parliament. I’ve reversed the scale, so higher 
values reflect more parliamentary control of the agenda relative to the government. Source: 
König and Luig 2014  
 VP_tsebelis (Veto Players): The number of veto players is calculated using data on 
governments from Tsebelis (bulk of data obtained from website). The values reflect the 
number of actors whose assent is necessary to enact policy change. The number of actors 
can fluctuate across time, depending upon government changes. The values do vary by state 
over the period, but the variation is rather narrow. See appendix for plot by state of values. 
Source: Tsebelis (website, book (2002)48). Website data downloaded fall 2015. 
 Alternate measure: Conflict (Coalition Conflict): Level of coalition conflict: distance 
between policy-area minister and furthest coalition member (or coalition support-member in 
the case of minority government) on a simplified left-right dimension. From König and Luig: 
Following Franchino and Høyland (2009: 612), we use party positions from expert surveys 
(Ray 1999; Benoit and Laver 2006; Steenbergen and Marks 2007) and calculate the mean 
value across the national implementation measures for each directive. To cope with missing 
data for Luxembourg, we use the data of the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP; Budge et 
al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006), aggregated on the left-right dimension using a method 
proposed by Gabel and Huber (2000). For the coding of parliaments and cabinets, we collect 
                                                       
46 These values are currently static for member countries. Future analysis will include the number of committees 
in each year as they fluctuate. 
47 For robustness, I’ve used two measures to capture the two key variables. The analyses are replicated using 
combinations of the two operationalizations of the two key variables. The analysis can be found in the following 
chapter with the additional models being included in the appendix of that chapter.  
48 Missing data for Greece supplemented from Tsebelis (2002) as are years for Italy for 1996 & 1997. 
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information provided by Müller and Strøm (2000), Woldendorp et al. (2000), and the political 
data yearbooks published in the European Journal of Political Research. Source: König and 
Luig 2014 
 Parliament: Whether the national Parliament was involved (1) or not (0) in 
implementation Source: König and Luig 2014 
 Policy factors: Work suggests (Haverland et al 2000, Börzel 2010, Börzel 2007, 
among many others) that policy domains are important and influential with respect to policy 
outcomes. For example, some domain areas may entail more technical details, more 
mundane policies, or more controversial topics. Although I don’t delve into these arguments 
here, I include dummy variables for the policies to demonstrate that even when accounting for 
factors known to influence implementation, the effects are consistent.  
 Agricult (Agriculture): Policy Area. Source: König and Luig 2014 
 Environ (Environment): Policy Area. Source: König and Luig 2014 
 Interior: Policy Area. Source: König and Luig 2014 
 Industry: Policy Area. Source: König and Luig 2014 
 P_admin (Public Administration) Policy Area. Source: König and Luig 2014 
 P_health (Public Health): Policy Area. Source: König and Luig 2014 
 Finance: Policy Area. Source: König and Luig 2014 
 Transport: Policy Area. Source: König and Luig 2014 
 Council: Whether the directive was authored by the Council (0, 1), with Council 
directives typically affording more discretion. The question of whether Council directives are 
inherently more flexible has been discussed at length in the literature, although some scholars 
have chosen to use other measures in place of the dummy for Council authorship (Franchino 
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2004, Franchino & Høyland 2009). Upon my calculation, the correlation between an alternate 
measure of discretion—the number of provisions granting power to member states relative to 
the number of provisions within the directive—and whether a directive is a Council directive is 
approximately 0.8. This is high enough to justify using the Commission measure for now as 
this indicator is much more widely available and does not require subjective coding of 
provisions. (Source: König and Luig 2014) 
  Pages: Number of pages (standardized) when published in the Official Journal Source: 
König and Luig 2014 
 Deadline: Length of the transposition deadline (years) Source: König and Luig 2014 
 Complexity: Number of topics covered by a directive (based on the number of different 
directory codes covered). Ranges from 1 to 4. Source: König and Luig 2014 
 Efficiency: Categorical variable representing the efficiency (professionalism) of the 
bureaucracy. This variable is based on one constructed by Mbaye (2001) and consists of the 
following three factors: structural efficiency (performance-related pay), lack of permanent 
tenure, and public announcement of vacancies. Performance-related pay provides an 
incentive for dedication to one's job and quality of work product. Lack of permanent tenure 
provides more incentive to work than the presence of permanent tenure. Finally, public 
announcement of vacancies enables recruitment of higher caliber employees than within-the-
ranks hires might. Higher values reflect higher levels of efficiency. This variable is constant 
across time. Source: Auer et al (1996) 
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Table 3.1: Variables 
Variable 
 
Description Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Infringe_not Whether an infringement 
occurred (1) or not (0) 
17371 0.210 0.408 0 1 
Sub_not Whether a substantive 
infringement occurred (1) or 
not (0) 
17371 0.047 0.211 0 1 
Late_not Whether a late infringement 
occurred (1) or not (0) 
17371 0.176 0.381 0 1 
Prior Whether a state reported 
legislation in transposition 
that was enacted prior to the 
deadline for the directive (1) 
or not (0) 
17371 0.139 0.346 0 1 
Approval The shortest distance 
between the minister's party 
and that of the Council of 
Ministers. Positive values 
reflect higher approval. 
17371 0.029 0.122 -0.4 0.32 
Strong National parliamentary 
strength: categorical 
variable from 0 to 4 
(strongest)  
17371 2.270 1.536 0 4 
Agenda_rev Strength of agenda 
(reversed): reflects the 
national parliament’s 
strength relative to the 
government in controlling 
the legislative agenda 
17371
  
0.523 0.291 0 1 
VP_tsebelis Veto players: number of 
actors whose assent is 
required to enact policy 
change 
17371   2.260   1.255      1 6 
Conflict Level of coalition conflict: 
distance between furthest 
coalition member and 
policy-area minister 
17371 0.171 0.129 0 0.65 
Parliament Binary variable reflecting 
whether national Parliament 
was involved (1) or not (0) in 
implementation of the 
directive 
17371 0.102 0.303 0 1 
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Agricult Policy Area 17371 0.328 0.470 0 1 
Environ Policy Area 17371 0.056 0.229 0 1 
Interior Policy Area 17371 0.004 0.059 0 1 
Industry Policy Area 17371 0.433 0.495 0 1 
P_admin Policy Area 17371 0.008 0.089 0 1 
P_health Policy Area 17371 0.020 0.140 0 1 
Finance Policy Area 17371 0.040 0.196 0 1 
Transport Policy Area 17371 0.067 0.250 0 1 
Council Whether the directive is a 
Council directive (1) or not 
(0) (Commission)  
17371 0.649 0.477 0 1 
Pages Number of pages 
(standardized) when 
published in the Official 
Journal 
17371 0.051 0.103 0 1 
Deadline Length of the transposition 
deadline (years)  
17371 0.981 0.867 0 8.3 
Complexity Number of topics covered 
by a directive. 
17371 1.237 0.499 1 4 
Efficiency Categorical variable 
representing the efficiency 
(professionalism) of the 
bureaucracy. Higher values 
reflect higher levels of 
efficiency 
17371 1.529 0.765 1 3 
 
Model Selection and Explanation 
 
 Existing approaches to noncompliance typically consider infringements as occurring for 
a similar reason or as interchangeable. There has been little work done directly comparing 
timing and substance. Those that have contrasted the two have argued that there is a likely a 
tradeoff between timing and correctness of implementation (Thomson et al 2007, 
Mastenbroek 2007). Thus, to understand the emergence of noncompliance, we must select a 
model that can investigate this potential difference between late and substantive 
infringements. In the sections that follow, I describe different model frameworks that merit 
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consideration and the motivations for selecting the model chosen. I conclude the seemingly 
unrelated probit is appropriate given the underlying framework of the data, arguments for 
noncompliance, and assumptions of the models. 
Count Models/Regression 
 
 Previous approaches to infringements have frequently looked either at the number or 
share of infringements incurred by a state per time period (often over each year). While these 
approaches are able to estimate the magnitude of noncompliance, they are not able to 
distinguish a) between different types of infringement nor b) between policy-area differences 
across directives as the data are aggregated to the state-year level. It is possible to tally the 
number or share of late and substantive infringements and analyze these separately, but such 
analysis would still require aggregation at the state level. Such aggregation would fail to 
capture the role of the national parliament in implementation and the preferences of state 
actors (policy-area minister and coalition members) on infringements.  
 For these reasons, models of these types are not appropriate for the task at hand, as 
they do not allow the fine-grained distinction we need to further explore the problems of late 
and substantive infringement. 
Ordinal Logit 
 
 An ordinal logit model allows the representation of noncompliance along a scale from 
full compliance (where no noncompliance is observed) to complete lack of compliance (non-
notification of measures), with the order of categories being particularly important. There are 
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two potential problems with this framework, one pertaining to the order noncompliance and 
one regarding assumptions of the model. 
 Regarding the ordering of noncompliance: it is difficult to determine whether 
substantive noncompliance should be viewed as more or less of an infringement than late 
infringements. Substantive infringements occur when legislation has been enacted but the 
legislation is either incorrect or incorrectly applied (for example, it is on the books, but not 
enforced). Late infringements can include measures that are never notified (occurs in 
practice, but typically states are pursued until they notify some measures unless the directive 
is not significant and/or replaced/amended by a different directive) and those that are simply 
late. When measures are late, no action has been taken and the default legislation is 
whatever currently exists within the member state. Substantive infringements can also leave 
gaps such that existing state legislation is the default (and so late and substantive 
infringements are equivalent). Substantive infringements can be worse than late infringements 
because they introduce a new complication (for example, if a state imposes a new ban, as 
some states did when they did not retroactively apply parental leave policies in transposing 
legislation). This can be further complicated by the appearance of state compliance: when 
states fail to notify measures and incur a late infringement, this is easily monitored by the 
Commission. Substantive infringements are more difficult to detect and thus may be worse 
than late infringements in that the costs of a substantive infringement are higher because they 
persist for longer on average than late infringements and are less likely to be detected.  
 However, satisfying the question of whether or not an order of infringement severity 
exists is insufficient. A subsequent question regarding whether the model is appropriate 
exists. An important assumption of the ordinal logistic model is that there are proportional 
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odds over the types of infringement. This means that each independent variable has the 
same effect at each level of the independent variable: that is that the effects of any individual 
are the same for each type of noncompliance. If we anticipate variables to have different 
effects at each level of the independent variable—for example, if we anticipate that some 
variables will be significant at one level and not at another or, if some variables are positive 
for some but negative for other levels—then this model is not appropriate. As evidence 
indicates that late and substantive infringements are indeed distinct and will likely have 
different variables influencing their incidence, this model is not appropriate.  
Multinomial Logit 
 
 Multinomial logit allows for modeling a scenario in which actors may decide to comply, 
delay or infringe. This choice is made simultaneously and requires actors to determine their 
compliance path at the time of implementation (actors cannot sequence actions by first being 
late, and then choosing noncompliance, for example). Unlike in ordinal logit, there is no 
presumed ordering relationship between the categories.  
 The assumptions for this model are that the categories are mutually exclusive and 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The current framework (compliant, late, 
substantive) does not satisfy this requirement as states may suffer both late and substantive 
infringements. A slight modification from the ordinal logistic setup—the addition of one more 
measure of noncompliance (when states incur both late and substantive violations)—allows 
the satisfaction of the first requirement. IIA requires that the odds of any particular category, 
for example, the odds of substantive noncompliance, are independent of the odds for late 
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noncompliance.  
 However, IIA is a bit more difficult to fulfill, as the underlying argument regarding 
noncompliance is that actors are choosing between noncompliance modes. Furthermore, the 
correlation between late and substantive infringements points to some underlying relationship 
between the two types of infringements. Thus, the removal of one category of noncompliance, 
or the addition of one more category, would likely shift the odds between the different types of 
categories in a non-proportional way, violating the IIA requirement. This means that 
multinomial logit is likely a poor fit for this scenario. 
Bivariate Probit 
 
 Using seemingly unrelated probit allows for modeling a scenario in which actors may 
decide to delay or infringe and may make these two seemingly unrelated decisions 
simultaneously. These decisions may not be completely unrelated and using seemingly 
unrelated probit allows for both the inclusion of multiple dependent variables (the two types of 
noncompliance) and allows for correlation in the error terms across the two equations.  
 This approach has the advantage over both the ordinal and multinomial logit in that the 
overlap of choices (late and substantive) is not a cause for concern. Furthermore, the failure 
of IIA is also not a concern for this framework. Thus, seemingly unrelated probit allows for a 
comparison between the two types of infringements while explicitly acknowledging the 
possible overlap in factors contributing to the incidence of late and/or substantive 
infringements. There are two things to note about this framework: 1) the size of the dataset 
may obviate the need for such a framework and 2) the reported correlation between the two 
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equations, while significant, is quite small (rho is less than 0.10). Thus, while the model may 
be the best fit theoretically, the advantages it offers over simply estimating two probit models, 
one for late and one for substantive, may be minimal.  
Contributions of the Dataset 
 
 This dataset provides an innovative look at noncompliance in the European Union. 
Data on noncompliance have never been examined on a by-case basis like this. Previous 
work has been aggregated to the state level or focused upon a small sub-set of cases. 
Furthermore, I have disaggregated the data available from the commission to include every 
directive mentioned in a citation (explained in greater detail above).  
 By combining these data with data on state preferences, I provide a means to 
scrutinize and evaluate noncompliance at the state-directive level. These data can be used to 
analyze the relationship between preferences and noncompliance systematically, something 
previous research has not been able to accomplish for lack of data.  
Summary 
 
 In conclusion, the combination of variables here provides a unique dataset capable of 
exploring unanswered questions of member state noncompliance. By structuring data in this 
way, I can explain differences between late and substantive infringements. I also use a 
different model to approach the question of noncompliance, addressing the distinct types of 
noncompliance while permitting the relationship of the incidence of late and substantive 
infringements. I determine that the most suitable model for analysis is a bivariate probit, the 
results of which are to be discussed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter IV: Analysis 
 
 Now that we understand the magnitude of the problem presented by noncompliance, 
and the data and theory used to analyze this problem, I turn to an empirical evaluation. In this 
chapter, I provide a short background on previous empirical approaches to the problem of 
noncompliance. I then introduce my model, providing evidence for why a distinction between 
late and substantive infringements is necessary before moving to the model itself. I 
emphasize the inability of previous approaches to capture the distinction between late and 
substantive infringements and their associated factors. This failure mischaracterizes the 
relationship between institutional frameworks, national actors and noncompliance. Having 
demonstrated the need for a more nuanced approach, I next introduce the model, interpret its 
results and provide graphical support for the effect of the involvement of a strong national49 
parliament in the face of potential conflict among national actors—the case of multiple veto 
players. Finally, I provide an analysis on the overall suitability of my model, including 
assessments of the model fit, and relationship between variables. The appendices, introduced 
where relevant, provide additional support and analysis. 
                                                       
49 As mentioned in chapter two, all references to a parliament, unless otherwise noted, are to the national 
parliament of the country. 
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Existing Approaches  
 
 Existing studies of infringements have often considered either timing alone or 
infringements from the state-year level. The first model I present illustrates how the distinction 
between late and substantive infringements provides more clarity in the understanding of 
state infringements. The model is a probit with the outcome being whether an infringement is 
observed or not. Positive (and significant) coefficients indicate a positive relationship between 
the independent and the dependent variable. Negative (and significant) coefficients indicate a 
negative relationship between the independent and dependent variables (increases in that 
variable lead to a reduction in the probability of observing the dependent variable). 
 An additional factor to consider is the theoretical approach behind the choice of a 
particular model. For example, a model that considers a question of infringement or not, 
implies that the important question is whether an infringement arises or not. It also implicitly 
assumes that all infringements are similar, similar enough to be grouped into the same 
category of ‘noncompliant’. In contrast, a model that distinguishes between late and 
substantive infringement can contribute to four different types of conclusions: 1) whether 
something contributes to late infringements alone, 2) whether something contributes to 
substantive infringements alone, 3) whether something contributes to both late and 
substantive infringements and 4) whether something contributes to neither late nor 
substantive infringements. In this modeling scenario, the distinction between late and 
substantive infringements allows the same question of the previous infringement-or-not model 
but also provides for the possibility that not all infringements are the same. In the 
infringement-or-not model, any form of noncompliance is considered problematic and deriving 
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from the same root causes. Such a view is theoretically misguided as there are different types 
of noncompliance that can occur, each under distinct conditions. In a model that conflates the 
two, this confusion leads to unclear results and explanations, as we will see. Practically, this 
confusion becomes clear in the value and significance of important predictors: several 
covariates are not significant (such as the interaction between a strong and involved national 
parliament with many veto players).  
As we will see in the models analyzing late and substantive infringements, some 
factors, such as ministerial approval, are positively associated with one type of infringement 
(substantive) while negatively associated with the other type (late). In the joint model, this 
distinction is missed. For these variables (also including whether prior measures are reported 
in transposition), their interpretation would lead to incorrect results. For example, a researcher 
evaluating results from the infringement-based model would conclude that approval by the 
policy-area minister is not a significant factor in infringements at the 0.05 level, despite strong 
significance in the late infringement model and existing research (König and Luig 2014) 
pointing to its significance. Such a conflation would understate the power and significance of 
policy-area ministers in the implementation process, something necessary to understand 
when studying late infringements since hasty implementation can lead to incorrect 
transposition.  
 Perhaps more troubling is the relationship between whether a state reports pre-existing 
legislation in the transposition process and the incidence of infringements. States that report 
previously existing legislation are less likely to have a late infringement, likely because it does 
not take any time to enact or approve this legislation. However, the use of prior legislation is 
strongly and positively associated with substantive infringements, but this association is 
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missed in the aggregate analysis. Thus, the use of these measures would lead to an increase 
in difficult-to-detect substantive infringements, rather than a decrease in overall infringements. 
These types of measures are associated with faster implementation, but faster is not always 
best when all types of infringements are included. 
 While there are some relationships that are captured by focusing holistically on 
infringements, such a broad approach is unable to capture distinctions between late and 
substantive infringement. This is true particularly in cases where the same variable has 
different relationships with the different types of infringement, as in the cases of ministerial 
approval and the use of prior legislation. It is precisely these types of factors that we are most 
interested in, yet they would not be detected using previous approaches. Furthermore, the 
role of in-coalition conflict and the strength and involvement of national parliamentary 
institutions is completely missed in such an approach because it is relevant for only 
substantive infringements. Thus, the extant approach gives an incomplete and misleading 
picture of how infringements arise. 
Table 4.1: Model 0, Consideration of Infringements 
VARIABLES Infringement 
  
Notification prior to the adoption date -0.0658+ 
 (0.0342) 
Ministerial approval  -0.182+ 
 (0.0943) 
Strong -0.125*** 
 (0.0175) 
Veto Players -0.127*** 
 (0.0302) 
Strong x Veto Players 0.0574*** 
 (0.00883) 
Parliamentary involvement = 1 0.635*** 
 (0.167) 
Parliament Involved x Strong 0.0393 
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 (0.0531) 
Parliament Involved x Veto Players -0.0856 
 (0.0936) 
Parliament Involved x Strong x Veto Players 0.000792 
 (0.0277) 
Agriculture -0.0885 
 (0.0543) 
Environment 0.292*** 
 (0.0654) 
Interior 0.287+ 
 (0.172) 
Industry/trade -0.106* 
 (0.0532) 
Public administration 0.410*** 
 (0.121) 
Public health -0.210* 
 (0.0911) 
Finance -0.842*** 
 (0.0873) 
Transport -0.135* 
 (0.0666) 
Council = 1 0.312*** 
 (0.0258) 
Page length 1.169*** 
 (0.105) 
Complexity -0.0180 
 (0.0231) 
Bureaucratic Efficiency -0.392*** 
 (0.0174) 
Constant -0.239** 
 (0.0857) 
  
Observations 17,371 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
 
  If we base our interpretation of when infringements occur from the above model, we 
would conclude that the driving factors are veto players, national parliaments and that a 
strong national parliament is associated with more infringements when combined with many 
veto players. The use of previously existing national measures and (policy-area) ministerial 
approval are associated with fewer infringements but have a very low level of significance. 
These results will appear very familiar when we turn to the results of considering late 
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infringements. Because so many late infringements occur, focusing upon infringements jointly 
produces results that appear similar to those for late infringements only. This leads to 
spurious relationships (prior measures seem to lead to fewer infringements overall, despite a 
positive association with substantive infringements as we later see) or weaker relationships 
(for example, the strength of the relationship between policy-area ministerial approval and late 
infringements is stronger than for the whole body of infringements). Finally, some results are 
not significant at all, despite significance in both late and substantive models separately. This 
includes the relationship between strong, involved national parliaments when many veto 
players are present and policy-area factors, such as: industry/trade, public health and 
transport.  
 While these missed connections many not appear to be important for our 
understanding of cases in which late and substantive infringements arise, circumstances 
where late and substantive infringements diverge are particular important for understanding 
state compliance. Because late infringements are much easier to detect and comprise the 
bulk of Commission enforcement, any model that compares both late and substantive 
together will miss circumstances favoring substantive infringement. Because factors 
contributing to substantive infringement are increasing over time (such as the involvement of 
national parliaments), there is reason to suspect that substantive infringements are likely to 
be increasing. Thus, a joint model will miss circumstances that contribute to substantive 
infringement, as we see above. Only a model that distinguishes between late and substantive 
infringements will be able to explain the incidence of both types of infringement, which will 
contribute to a clearer picture of noncompliance.  
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Model: Seemingly Unrelated Probit 
 
 ‘Seemingly unrelated’ models allow for modeling a scenario in which actors may decide 
to delay or infringe and may make these two seemingly unrelated decisions simultaneously. A 
seemingly unrelated probit is an estimation using two probit equations to model the two 
decisions facing actors. These decisions may not be completely unrelated and a multinomial 
logit would not be appropriate since there is overlap in some of the categories (for example, 
there may be some delay that occurs, either by choice or not) as a result of the decision to 
substantively deviate from the mandate of the directive. Thus, we can adequately distinguish 
between late and substantive infringements. See Chapter Four for more information on model 
selection and seemingly unrelated probit in particular. Using seemingly unrelated probit allows 
the inclusion of multiple dependent variables and allows for correlation in the error terms of 
the two equations.  
 
Logic of Bivariate Probit 
 
 In the model, there are two probit equations: in the first, actors decide to substantively 
infringe, or not; in the second, they make the choice between late infringement or not. The 
two choices may appear to be independent but, for a number of reasons (including the 
correlations between late and substantive infringement cases we explored before), we believe 
there is a potential underlying relationship guiding the choice in the two equations.50  
                                                       
50 The use of a bivariate probit is meant to address the underlying correlation between the two dependent 
variables of interest. Little correlation between the two results in an inefficient estimation. In this case, although 
the correlation between late and substantive infringement is quite low (~0.05), there is reason to believe that 
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Interpretation 
 
 The model is essentially two probit models and the results from each model can be 
interpreted as one would interpret a probit model. Positive values indicate a positive 
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable. Negative values 
indicate a negative relationship between the independent and dependent variable. There are 
two dependent variables: the incidence of either substantive infringements or late 
infringements. The two columns of coefficients are associated with the two distinct outcomes 
of interest (1) substantive infringements and (2) late infringements. Aside from the sign (and 
significance) of the coefficients, it is also worthwhile to note whether the signs are similar or 
different across the columns. For example, when an independent variable has the same sign 
for the substantive (1) and late infringement (2) equations, this indicates that the variable is 
positively associated with both substantive and late infringements. When there are different 
signs in the two columns, as with ‘Notification prior to the adoption date,’ this indicates that the 
variable has a positive relationship with the incidence of one type of infringement (in this case, 
substantive) and a negative relationship with the incidence of the other type of infringement 
(in this case, late infringement). Thus, we can understand that if a state uses previously-
enacted national legislation, there will be a positive relationship with substantive infringements 
and negative with late. In other words, the use of this legislation is likely to save time but to be 
substantively incorrect with respect to the directive at hand. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
the underlying processes contributing to late and substantive infringements are related. Thus, despite the low 
correlation, the model is appropriate for the situation. Separate probit estimations are included in Appendix B 
(substantive) and Appendix C (late). Note that using a bivariate probit framework provides a stronger test for 
my argument than using two probits: the permitted correlation between the two estimations produces larger 
standard errors, thereby making significance of coefficient estimates potentially lower than in a probit 
estimation.  
 117 
 To understand the relationship between different factors and both types of 
infringements, we must note the signs within each model and observe whether these signs 
are consistent across the two models. If all the signs were the same across the two 
equations, then it would make no difference to distinguish between late and substantive 
infringements. Differences in signs across the two equations indicate that the variable in 
question has a different effect on the two types of infringements.  
Expectations, Revisited 
As a reminder, here are the expectations developed in chapter two: 
1. Approval by the policy-area minister will be negatively associated with late infringements. 
2. Late infringements are also likely to arise when there exists conflict amongst actors and no 
institutional opportunities to voice that disagreement, specifically: 
a. Strong National Parliament x National Parliament involved 
b. In-coalition Conflict x (any) National Parliament involved 
c. In-coalition Conflict x Strong National Parliament 
3. Substantive infringements are likely to arise when there exist disagreements among 
coalition members and strong national parliamentary institutions that are also involved in 
legislating. 
We will consider these expectations when evaluating the model. 
Operationalization 
 
 A brief note on variables: There are different ways to capture coalition conflict and 
institutional strength. Conflict is measured either as the distance between the furthest coalition 
partner and the policy-area minister or the number of veto players (Tsebelis 1999). 
Institutional strength is either measured using a categorical variable based on arguments from 
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Martin and Vanberg (2011) or reversing the scale for a government’s control of the agenda. 
For a deeper discussion of this, please see Chapter Four. 
 The different measurement possibilities lead to four combinations of power and conflict 
(vp * strong, vp * agenda, coalition conflict * strong, coalition conflict * agenda). I include 
results for the estimation with my preferred operationalization of these variables, but the other 
three estimations are consistent with the results presented in the following section. A master 
table comparing the four different estimations is included in Appendix E. 
 For our purposes, we will focus upon the factors that distinguish late from substantive 
infringements. I outline expectations for the two models in the sections that follow. 
Goals 
 
 Our goal is to understand the relationship between different important factors and our 
two outcomes of interest: substantive and late infringements. We theorized that substantive 
infringements—when the national measures enacted fall short of the directive’s mandate—
occur when three conditions are simultaneously present: (1) actors not only disagree with a 
directive, (2) they have the power to affect national legislation, and (3) they have the 
opportunity to do so, in the parliament. Late infringements, in contrast, arise when only some 
of these conditions are present: when actors disagree but lack tools to substantively influence 
legislation, e.g. when they have weak parliamentary powers but disagree with content, or 
when strong national parliaments are involved in the passage of legislation during the 
transposition process.  
To evaluate these claims, we will focus on each of the two columns in Model 1 
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separately. In the first, substantive infringement, we will focus upon an interaction term to 
address the simultaneity requirement for our three conditions—more specifically, a triple 
interaction between the involvement of the national parliament, its strength, and the number of 
veto players. In the second, late infringement, we will focus upon the ‘two of three’ scenarios, 
represented by double interactions. For ease of review, I’ve bolded both the variable and 
coefficient for the discussed elements in the upcoming analysis. Let us now turn to our 
evaluation. 
Table 4.2: Model 1  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Substantive 
Infringement 
Late 
Infringement 
   
Notification prior to the adoption date 0.310*** -0.210*** 
 (0.0483) (0.0372) 
Ministerial approval 0.250 -0.281** 
 (0.163) (0.0974) 
Strong Parliament -0.138*** -0.116*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0181) 
Veto Players -0.205*** -0.117*** 
 (0.0573) (0.0311) 
Strong Parliament x Veto Players 0.0723*** 0.0532*** 
 (0.0165) (0.00909) 
Parliamentary involvement 1.353*** -0.115 
 (0.213) (0.180) 
Parliament x Strong Parliament -0.235*** 0.234*** 
 (0.0677) (0.0568) 
Parliament x Veto Players -0.433*** 0.178+ 
 (0.130) (0.0988) 
Parliament x Strong Parliament x Veto Players 0.129*** -0.0846** 
 (0.0375) (0.0292) 
Agriculture -0.548*** 0.190** 
 (0.0840) (0.0589) 
Environment 0.633*** 0.159* 
 (0.0833) (0.0698) 
Interior 0.841*** -0.0811 
 (0.184) (0.204) 
Industry/trade -0.192** 0.0601 
 (0.0742) (0.0569) 
Public administration 0.944*** 0.175 
 (0.132) (0.130) 
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Public health 0.0606 -0.225* 
 (0.119) (0.0991) 
Finance -0.303** -0.862*** 
 (0.109) (0.111) 
Transport -0.224* 0.0295 
 (0.0980) (0.0710) 
Council  0.817*** 0.157*** 
 (0.0680) (0.0272) 
Page length 0.876*** 0.970*** 
 (0.151) (0.107) 
Complexity 0.0644+  
 (0.0386)  
Bureaucratic Efficiency -0.201*** -0.409*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0186) 
Deadline length  0.145*** 
  (0.0145) 
Constant -1.914*** -0.543*** 
 (0.149) (0.0872) 
   
Observations 17,371 17,371 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
 
Substantive Infringements 
 
 The most salient expectation for substantive infringements is expectation three. 3: 
Substantive infringements arise when three conditions are present: actors disagree with a 
directive, they have the power to affect national legislation, and they have the opportunity to 
do so in the national parliament. I capture this using an interaction between the involvement of 
the national parliament, the strength of the national parliament, and the number of national 
veto players. This effect is positive and statistically significant (Parliament * Strong 
Parliament * Veto Players).  
 When these factors are not met, that is, when there are only two of the three conditions 
met, we anticipate late infringements. Because substantive infringements cannot occur until a 
measure has been transposed, it is perhaps unsurprising that while these factors (where two 
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conditions are met) are positively associated with late infringements but, at times, negatively 
associated with substantive infringements. We see that substantive infringements are less 
likely when there is a strong national parliament involved (but few veto players) (Parliament * 
Strong Parliament) and when the parliament is involved and there is disagreement over the 
substance over material but the parliament is weak (not strong) (Parliament*Veto Players). 
We do see that strong parliaments and the presence of disagreement over content are 
associated with substantive infringements, even without the involvement of parliament, 
perhaps because these actors have additional power and could threaten the involvement of 
parliament and thereby extract compromises (Strong Parliament * Veto Players).  
 As we anticipated, substantive infringements occur when three elements are 
simultaneously present: disagreement over the directive, the national parliament is strong, 
and the national parliament is involved. This relationship is supported when jointly testing 
whether these three coefficients (in a probit model) are distinct from zero: they are 
significantly different at p=0.01. Thus, the combination of preferences, power, and institutions 
are strongly associated with substantive infringements. 
Late Infringements 
 
Expectations one and two apply to the incidence of late infringements. Late 
infringements arise primarily when policy-area ministers disagree with a proposed policy 
(ministerial approval is low). We anticipate late infringements in the following circumstances: 
when ministerial approval is low and when two of the three ‘ingredients’ for substantive 
infringement are present (the three elements being the involvement of parliament, a strong 
parliament, and many national veto players). We also see that while strong national 
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parliaments are negatively associated with late infringements, strong, involved national 
parliaments are positively associated with late infringements, most likely due to the 
involvement of additional veto players in the political process. 
Our expectations are fulfilled; ministerial approval is negatively associated with late 
infringements. Higher levels of ministerial approval are negatively associated with late 
infringements while lower levels of ministerial approval are positively associated with late 
infringements (Ministerial Approval).  
 Similarly, cases where two of the three elements are present (strong parliament 
involved and many national veto players, parliament and many veto players, parliament 
involved and a strong parliament) are all positively associated with late infringements. We do, 
however, see variation in whether these coefficients are significant or not. For the presence of 
a strong national parliament and many veto players (Strong Parliament * Veto Players), 
these actors are able to delay the process, perhaps using the threat of their power to drag out 
transposition. Similarly, the involvement of a strong national parliament (Parliament * Strong 
Parliament) is positively and significantly associated with delay: the involvement of more 
actors slows transposition.  
 Finally, the involvement of a national parliament and presence of many veto players 
also is positively associated with delay (Parliament * Veto Players), although the relationship 
is not significant. We see that the involvement of a strong parliament in the presence of 
disagreement over the directive (Parliament * Strong Parliament * Veto Players) is 
negatively associated with late infringements, perhaps because these actors are effective in 
securing the concessions they demand. 
 Thus, we see strong statistical support for the arguments presented above: substantive 
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infringements require the simultaneous presence of three distinct elements while late 
infringements occur when two of these elements are present. Substantive infringements arise 
when three conditions are simultaneously present: the national political actors not only 
disagree with a directive, AND they have the power to affect national legislation, AND they 
have the opportunity to do so, in the national parliament. Late infringements arise when only 
some of these conditions are present: when national political actors disagree but lack tools to 
substantively influence legislation, e.g. when coalition members have weak parliamentary 
powers but disagree with directive content, or when strong national parliaments are involved 
in the passage of legislation during the transposition process.  
These results are stable even when accounting for different measurements of the key 
predictors, as demonstrated in the appendices. I also consider the possibility that separating 
the multiple case-citation convention in the case of substantive infringements affects the 
results. To address this possibility, I cluster standard errors by state and by directive. The 
results are still consistent and supportive of my argument. See Appendix F for details. 
Marginal Effects 
 
 In this section, I illustrate the marginal effect of key variables from the model. Because 
these estimations are not possible using the bivariate probit framework in Stata, the graphs 
are produced by using a single probit. The effect of this choice is to have smaller standard 
errors than in the bivariate probit, but consistent results.  
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Substantive Model 
 
 In the substantive model, as the number of veto players increases, the involvement of a 
strong parliament leads to increasingly higher marginal probabilities of observing substantive 
infringement. In the figure below, we can see how the presence of multiple veto players is 
positively associated with the likelihood of substantive infringement in cases where a strong 
parliament is involved. This represents the marginal effect of the triple interaction from the 
model.  
 This effect is significantly distinct from zero at the p=0.05 level as indicated by the 
shaded confidence band. Furthermore, we see that the effect of parliamentary involvement is 
not always positive—when there are few veto players and the parliament is involved, there is 
a lower marginal effect on the probability of substantive infringement. That is, when there is a 
unitary government, the involvement of parliament is negatively associated with substantive 
infringements, most likely because the government is in consensus and the use of parliament 
is to enact compliant legislation.  
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Figure 4-1: Average Marginal Effects of Strong Parliament, Parliament Involved, on Substantive Infringement 
(over Veto Players) 
 
 
 We do not see the same degree of strength between the increase of veto players and 
the likelihood of substantive infringement when a strong parliament is not involved. This is 
illustrated in the figure below. Instead, the relationship, while distinct from zero, has a very 
small effect, particularly in comparison to parliamentary involvement of a strong parliament.  
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Figure 4-2: Average Marginal Effects of Strong Parliament on Substantive Infringement (over Veto Players) 
 
 
 Thus, we see that not only is the key factor from my model significant, its significance 
has substantive meaning—the effect is not trivial and does have influence on the outcome.  
Late Model 
 
 Here, there are a number of important differences from the substantive model that 
provide an avenue for future research. I present the same figure for the late infringement 
model as in the substantive model (figure 4-2). Note three differences: 1) the results for 
parliamentary involvement are not significant (unlike in the substantive model), 2) the 
involvement of parliament has a negative effect (unlike the positive effect in the substantive 
model) and 3) the relationship between veto players and the marginal effect on the likelihood 
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of late infringement can be positive or negative depending upon whether a strong parliament 
is involved (unlike in the case of substantive infringement). These differences a) demonstrate 
the justification for separating late and substantive infringement and b) point to a potentially 
contradictory role for veto players in late infringements. 
 Thus, the effect of a strong, involved parliament is not the same for substantive and 
late infringements. And, in the case of late infringements, veto players play a complex role. 
This likely stems from national efforts to meet deadlines by empowering policy-area ministers.  
 
Figure 4-3: Average Marginal Effects of Strong Parliament on Late Infringement (over Veto Players) 
 
 
 In this section, we have observed further evidence supporting the role of strong and 
involved parliaments for substantive infringements. We have also seen evidence supporting 
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the need for a distinction between late and substantive infringements. The next step is to then 
evaluate the fit and suitability of the model itself. 
Robustness Tests 
 
 To further evaluate the model, I also conducted a number of robustness tests. In the 
sections that follow, I investigate the specification of the model, the fit of the model, and the 
relationship between the variables in the model. I find that on the whole, my model performs 
very well, although the fit of the late model could be better. This will be evaluated in future 
work.  
Specification Error 
 
 The first test I perform is to see whether the model is correctly specified, that is, 
whether there are additional predictors that are omitted from the model. Significant predictors 
omitted from the model should only be significant by chance (the 0.05 probability for type I 
error). 
 To perform this test, I first do a probit analysis of the independent variables included in 
the bivariate probit for each of my two dependent variables and evaluate the square of the 
linear predicted value. Should this value be positive, there is a possibility that the model is not 
correctly specified. However, for both models, this value is not significant: 0.516 (substantive) 
and 0.884 (late). Thus, specification error is not a pressing concern. 
Goodness-of-Fit 
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 Now that I have evaluated the specification of the model, I turn to the fit of the model. 
The question being evaluated in the next sub-sections is how well the current model fits the 
data. I do this through two approaches: one to evaluate the fit through comparing the match 
between the predicted and actual values for the data using the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s 
goodness-of-fit test; the second test compares two nested models and evaluates whether the 
addition of variables fits the data better than the model without this variable. In both tests, the 
models presented here (Model 1) fit the data and does so better than the exclusion of my key 
explanatory variable (the triple interaction of strong, involved parliaments with many veto 
players).  
Hosmer 
 
 The Hosmer and Lemeshow test provides a measure of how closely the predicted and 
actual frequency of the dependent variable matches one another. The Hosmer and 
Lemeshow statistic is calculated as the Pearson chi-square from the contingency table of 
observed and expected frequencies. A good fit is indicated by a large p-value.51  
 I conducted this test on two probit equations, one for substantive infringements and 
one for late infringements. For substantive infringements, the probability was quite high 
(0.4068) while for late infringements, the value was not significant at p=0.05 (0.0553). This p-
value is a bit low and indicates that future research should more thoroughly examine the 
model for late infringement to determine if there might be a better way to evaluate late 
infringements.  
                                                       
51 When there are continuous predictors in the model, the convention is to combine the patterns formed by the 
predictor variable into 10 groups. This is because continuous variables, when not broken into groups, would 
yield artificially higher p-values and thus make it appear as though the model is a good fit. 
 130 
Fitstat 
 
 The next measure of goodness-of-fit focuses upon the core of my explanation for 
infringement. The models I present are similar in composition to those in previous research in 
that they contain ‘the usual suspects’—factors about national political systems, preferences 
and directives. How my approach differs from previous research is in how I approach 
infringements, distinguishing late from substantive infringements, and my focus on the 
simultaneous presence of key factors, strong parliaments with many veto players. I have 
already demonstrated that this interaction is significant. I can use fitstat to compare the fit of a 
model that does not include the interaction to one that does. Doing so enables me to look at 
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to see whether the model with the triple interaction 
better fits the data.52  
 When I compare two models, one with and without the triple interaction, the BIC values 
differ by 20.029 (substantive) and 11.640 (late) in favor of the interaction model.53 This means 
that there is very strong support for using the model with the triple interaction over one without 
in both models. Thus, the model that best tests my theory, developed in Chapter Three, also 
provides a better fit than a model that does not include this aspect of my argument. 
Multicollinearity 
 
 The final step is to consider the particular variables included in the model and their 
                                                       
52 To be clear: in this test, I evaluated a model with the variables alone (e.g. logit sub vp parl strong, etc) in 
comparison to a model that had these variables and their interactions.  
53 The value of the BIC reflects the strength of the comparative fit. The larger the value, the better one model fits 
in comparison than the other. BIC values from 0-2 are weak, 2-6 are positive, 6-10 are strong and 10+ are very 
strong. 
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relationship to one another. I evaluate whether there are relationships between the 
independent variables that might prove troublesome. To determine whether multicollinearity, 
near-perfect correlation between variables, is present, I conducted two separate logit 
estimations54 using the same variables from the bivariate probit. Here, we will focus upon the 
odds ratio, reported in the table below. If the odds ratio for a particular coefficient is rather 
large, we will have reason to suspect multicollinearity between some of the variables. There is 
no set cutoff for ‘large,’ but odds ratios of hundreds or higher deserve a closer look. As the 
table below shows, we do not have large coefficients that merit further scrutiny and thus 
multicollinearity is likely not a problem.  
Table 4.3: Model 1B, Odds Ratios 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Substantive 
Infringement 
Late 
Infringement 
   
Notification prior to the adoption date 1.859*** 0.673*** 
 (0.178) (0.0464) 
Ministerial approval 1.792+ 0.607** 
 (0.611) (0.104) 
Strong 0.764*** 0.825*** 
 (0.0512) (0.0270) 
Veto Players 0.672** 0.827*** 
 (0.0824) (0.0464) 
Strong x Veto Players 1.152*** 1.093*** 
 (0.0403) (0.0178) 
Parliamentary involvement = 1 12.58*** 0.782 
 (5.050) (0.241) 
Parliament Involved x Strong 0.654*** 1.532*** 
 (0.0839) (0.148) 
Parliament Involved x Veto Players 0.438** 1.393* 
 (0.110) (0.234) 
Parliament Involved x Strong x Veto 
Players 
1.274*** 0.857** 
 (0.0914) (0.0424) 
Agriculture 0.305*** 1.415*** 
                                                       
54 Note: I used a logit estimation here because log odds are not possible with a probit. While a probit provides a 
better fit for the model (the difference in log likelihood is small but provides positive support for probit 
estimation over logit), the results using logit estimation are consistent with those from a probit estimation. 
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 (0.0542) (0.146) 
Environment 3.391*** 1.339* 
 (0.531) (0.162) 
Interior 4.459*** 0.833 
 (1.446) (0.306) 
Industry/trade 0.667** 1.108 
 (0.0983) (0.110) 
Public administration 5.391*** 1.376 
 (1.255) (0.300) 
Public health 1.172 0.670* 
 (0.265) (0.119) 
Finance 0.544** 0.182*** 
 (0.120) (0.0422) 
Transport 0.623* 1.034 
 (0.127) (0.130) 
Council = 1 6.984*** 1.349*** 
 (1.201) (0.0661) 
Page length 5.868*** 5.043*** 
 (1.672) (0.906) 
Complexity 1.155+  
 (0.0941)  
Bureaucratic Efficiency 0.664*** 0.468*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0169) 
Late Infringement   
   
Deadline length  1.280*** 
  (0.0318) 
Constant 0.0215*** 0.420*** 
 (0.00694) (0.0650) 
   
Observations 17,371 17,371 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
 
Conclusions 
 
 This chapter comes to demonstrate that there exist key substantive differences 
between late and substantive infringements, as reflected in the data. I have outlined the 
different features contributing to late and substantive infringements. Furthermore, I have 
demonstrated the robustness of my model, specification and the role of particular cases in 
determining the fit of the overall model. My model provides a test of my argument that 
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demonstrates the strong relationship between three factors—parliaments, their strength and 
national actors—and the incidence of infringement. It provides support for my argument that 
substantive infringements arise when there exists disagreement, power, and opportunity for 
actors to act on their disagreement with a directive and late infringements arise when actors 
dislike a directive but lack the elements to shift policy outcomes.  
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Appendix A: Correlation Table 
Table 4.4: Correlation Table 
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Efficiency
-0.17
-0.05
0.13
0.01
-0.01
-0.04
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.14
0.00
0.05
0.69
0.77
0.83
0.71
0.54
0.90
0.64
0.95
0.94
0.97
0.84
0.55
year	of	
directive
0.12
-0.05
-0.04
-0.31
0.06
0.12
0.04
0.01
-0.07
0.04
-0.03
0.03
0.03
-0.04
0.07
-0.07
0.11
-0.07
0.08
-0.04
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Appendix B: Probit Results (Substantive) 
Table 4.5: Probit Model (Substantive) 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Substantive Infringement 
  
Notification prior to the adoption date 0.309*** 
 (0.0483) 
Ministerial approval 0.257 
 (0.163) 
Strong -0.139*** 
 (0.0313) 
Veto Players -0.209*** 
 (0.0575) 
Strong x Veto Players 0.0733*** 
 (0.0165) 
Parliamentary involvement = 1 1.349*** 
 (0.213) 
Parliament Involved x Strong -0.234*** 
 (0.0678) 
Parliament Involved x Veto Players -0.431*** 
 (0.130) 
Parliament Involved x Strong x Veto Players 0.129*** 
 (0.0376) 
Agriculture -0.542*** 
 (0.0840) 
Environment 0.635*** 
 (0.0834) 
Interior 0.842*** 
 (0.184) 
Industry/trade -0.192** 
 (0.0743) 
Public administration 0.949*** 
 (0.132) 
Public health 0.0632 
 (0.119) 
Finance -0.301** 
 (0.109) 
Transport -0.225* 
 (0.0982) 
Council = 1 0.813*** 
 (0.0679) 
Page length 0.865*** 
 (0.151) 
Complexity 0.0649+ 
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 (0.0386) 
Bureaucratic Efficiency -0.201*** 
 (0.0285) 
Constant -1.907*** 
 (0.148) 
  
Observations 17,371 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Appendix C: Probit Results (Late) 
Table 4.6: Probit Model (Late) 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Late Infringement 
  
Notification prior to the adoption date -0.209*** 
 (0.0372) 
Ministerial approval -0.281** 
 (0.0974) 
Strong -0.116*** 
 (0.0181) 
Veto Players -0.117*** 
 (0.0311) 
Strong x Veto Players 0.0532*** 
 (0.00909) 
Parliamentary involvement = 1 -0.118 
 (0.180) 
Parliament Involved x Strong 0.234*** 
 (0.0568) 
Parliament Involved x Veto Players 0.178+ 
 (0.0988) 
Parliament Involved x Strong x Veto Players -0.0849** 
 (0.0292) 
Council = 1 0.157*** 
 (0.0272) 
Page length 0.967*** 
 (0.107) 
Deadline length 0.147*** 
 (0.0145) 
Agriculture 0.192** 
 (0.0589) 
Environment 0.161* 
 (0.0698) 
Interior -0.0765 
 (0.203) 
Industry/trade 0.0613 
 (0.0569) 
Public administration 0.178 
 (0.130) 
Public health -0.225* 
 (0.0992) 
Finance -0.862*** 
 (0.111) 
Transport 0.0306 
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 (0.0710) 
Bureaucratic Efficiency -0.409*** 
 (0.0186) 
Constant -0.546*** 
 (0.0872) 
  
Observations 17,371 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Appendix D: State Dummies Included 
Table 4.7: Model with State Dummies 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES sub_not late_not 
   
Notification prior to the adoption date 0.305*** -0.199*** 
 (0.0491) (0.0379) 
Ministerial approval 0.295+ -0.445*** 
 (0.172) (0.103) 
Strong -0.206+ -0.0325 
 (0.123) (0.0520) 
Veto Players -0.218** 0.229*** 
 (0.0810) (0.0442) 
Strong x Veto Players 0.0686* -0.0875*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0151) 
Parliamentary involvement = 1 1.223*** 0.0679 
 (0.216) (0.185) 
Parliament Involved x Strong -0.204** 0.173** 
 (0.0686) (0.0579) 
Parliament Involved x Veto Players -0.334* 0.145 
 (0.131) (0.101) 
Parliament Involved x Strong x Veto Players 0.106** -0.0709* 
 (0.0377) (0.0295) 
Agriculture -0.562*** 0.196*** 
 (0.0848) (0.0593) 
Environment 0.634*** 0.177* 
 (0.0840) (0.0704) 
Interior 0.813*** -0.0699 
 (0.185) (0.204) 
Industry/trade -0.201** 0.0650 
 (0.0749) (0.0574) 
Public administration 0.943*** 0.177 
 (0.133) (0.132) 
Public health 0.0609 -0.224* 
 (0.120) (0.0995) 
Finance -0.313** -0.873*** 
 (0.109) (0.113) 
Transport -0.221* 0.0289 
 (0.0993) (0.0716) 
Council = 1 0.807*** 0.172*** 
 (0.0684) (0.0275) 
Page length 0.920*** 0.955*** 
 (0.153) (0.109) 
Complexity 0.0751+  
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 (0.0391)  
Bureaucratic Efficiency 0.129 -0.499*** 
 (0.268) (0.103) 
 BE 1.007*** 0.0665 
 (0.290) (0.118) 
 DE 0.731** 0.423*** 
 (0.282) (0.127) 
 DK -0.135 -0.171 
 (0.383) (0.173) 
 EL 0.522 -0.167 
 (0.437) (0.167) 
 ES 0.918*** -0.344*** 
 (0.252) (0.102) 
 FI -0.545 -0.382* 
 (0.451) (0.194) 
 FR 0.649 -0.774*** 
 (0.539) (0.211) 
 IE 0.389 -0.741*** 
 (0.541) (0.211) 
 IT 0.857** 0.749*** 
 (0.300) (0.143) 
 LU 0.580* -0.181+ 
 (0.274) (0.0994) 
 NL 0.388* -0.180* 
 (0.190) (0.0911) 
 PT 0.748* -0.100 
 (0.344) (0.128) 
 SE - - 
   
UK - - 
   
Deadline length  0.146*** 
  (0.0146) 
Constant -2.768*** -0.456 
 (0.815) (0.318) 
   
Observations 17,371 17,371 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Appendix E: Master List of Analysis 
Table 4.8: Master Table of Analysis 
  (1) (2) (4) (5) (7) (8) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES Sub Late Sub Late Sub Late Sub Late 
Notification prior 
to the adoption 
date 0.297*** -0.214*** 0.297*** -0.213*** 0.310*** -0.210*** 0.307*** -0.211*** 
 (0.0482) (0.0372) (0.0482) (0.0372) (0.0483) (0.0372) (0.0484) (0.0372) 
Ministerial 
approval 0.312+ -0.183+ 0.353* -0.164+ 0.250 -0.281** 0.328* -0.253** 
 (0.162) (0.0964) (0.163) (0.0972) (0.163) (0.0974) (0.164) (0.0975) 
Strong -0.0610* -0.0777***     -0.138*** -0.116***     
 (0.0252) (0.0144)   (0.0313) (0.0181)   
Parliamentary 
Strength (Agenda 
Reversed)     -0.283* -0.395***     -0.891*** -0.531*** 
   (0.140) (0.0829)   (0.195) (0.112) 
Coalition conflict -0.793* -0.896*** 0.728+ 0.989***         
 (0.325) (0.176) (0.372) (0.216)     
Veto Players         -0.205*** -0.117*** 0.178*** 0.121*** 
     (0.0573) (0.0311) (0.0376) (0.0211) 
Strong x Conflict 0.340** 0.434***             
 (0.124) (0.0681)       
Agenda_rev x 
Conflict     1.585* 1.762***         
   (0.627) (0.358)     
Strong x Veto 
Players         0.0723*** 0.0532***     
     (0.0165) (0.00909)   
Agenda_rev x 
Veto Players             0.502*** 0.184** 
       (0.109) (0.0570) 
Parliamentary 
Involvement = 1 1.029*** 0.127 0.158 0.849*** 1.353*** -0.115 0.0324 0.959*** 
 (0.145) (0.135) (0.210) (0.172) (0.213) (0.180) (0.219) (0.175) 
Parliament 
Involved x Strong -0.158** 0.148**     -0.235*** 0.234***     
 (0.0595) (0.0513)   (0.0677) (0.0568)   
Parliament 
Involved x 
c.agenda_rev     -1.016** 0.779*     -1.478** 0.993* 
   (0.349) (0.311)   (0.467) (0.392) 
Parliament Involved 
x Conflict -2.238** 0.387 1.184 -1.736**         
 (0.840) (0.725) (0.767) (0.641)     
Parliament Involved 
x Veto Players         -0.433*** 0.178+ 0.196* -0.194** 
     (0.130) (0.0988) (0.0840) (0.0677) 
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 (1) (2) (4) (5) (7) (8) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES Sub Late Sub Late Sub Late Sub Late 
Parliament 
Involved x Strong 
x Conflict 0.758* -0.452+       
 (0.304) (0.256)       
Parliament 
Involved x 
Agenda_rev x 
Conflict     3.030* -2.140+         
   (1.418) (1.253)     
Parliament 
Involved x Strong 
x Veto Players         0.129*** -0.0846**     
     (0.0375) (0.0292)   
Parliament 
Involved x 
Agenda_rev x 
Veto Players             0.593* -0.301 
       (0.247) (0.196) 
Agriculture -0.538*** 0.193** -0.526*** 0.197*** -0.548*** 0.190** -0.528*** 0.191** 
 (0.0835) (0.0589) (0.0835) (0.0588) (0.0840) (0.0589) (0.0839) (0.0588) 
         
Environment 0.636*** 0.152* 0.636*** 0.151* 0.633*** 0.159* 0.643*** 0.158* 
 (0.0830) (0.0698) (0.0830) (0.0697) (0.0833) (0.0698) (0.0834) (0.0697) 
Interior 0.833*** -0.0836 0.824*** -0.0962 0.841*** -0.0811 0.844*** -0.0856 
 (0.183) (0.203) (0.183) (0.203) (0.184) (0.204) (0.183) (0.203) 
Industry/trade -0.192** 0.0632 -0.180* 0.0657 -0.192** 0.0601 -0.180* 0.0599 
 (0.0740) (0.0569) (0.0738) (0.0569) (0.0742) (0.0569) (0.0742) (0.0569) 
Public 
administration 0.950*** 0.182 0.948*** 0.181 0.944*** 0.175 0.952*** 0.177 
 (0.131) (0.129) (0.131) (0.129) (0.132) (0.130) (0.132) (0.130) 
Public health 0.0525 -0.226* 0.0563 -0.222* 0.0606 -0.225* 0.0620 -0.222* 
 (0.119) (0.0991) (0.119) (0.0990) (0.119) (0.0991) (0.119) (0.0990) 
Finance -0.304** -0.874*** -0.306** -0.874*** -0.303** -0.862*** -0.298** -0.863*** 
 (0.108) (0.112) (0.108) (0.112) (0.109) (0.111) (0.108) (0.111) 
Transport -0.219* 0.0311 -0.211* 0.0293 -0.224* 0.0295 -0.210* 0.0265 
 (0.0976) (0.0711) (0.0975) (0.0710) (0.0980) (0.0710) (0.0980) (0.0710) 
Council = 1 0.815*** 0.156*** 0.808*** 0.155*** 0.817*** 0.157*** 0.812*** 0.158*** 
 (0.0677) (0.0271) (0.0675) (0.0271) (0.0680) (0.0272) (0.0679) (0.0272) 
Page length 0.866*** 0.971*** 0.864*** 0.967*** 0.876*** 0.970*** 0.885*** 0.962*** 
 (0.151) (0.107) (0.151) (0.107) (0.151) (0.107) (0.151) (0.107) 
Complexity 0.0577  0.0584  0.0644+  0.0622  
 (0.0386)  (0.0385)  (0.0386)  (0.0386)  
Bureaucratic 
Efficiency -0.223*** -0.436*** -0.227*** -0.439*** -0.201*** -0.409*** -0.203*** -0.404*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0188) (0.0299) (0.0196) (0.0285) (0.0186) (0.0289) (0.0188) 
Deadline length  0.146***  0.146***  0.145***  0.145*** 
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  (0.0145)  (0.0145)  (0.0145)  (0.0145) 
Constant -2.093*** -0.582*** -2.364*** -0.949*** -1.914*** -0.543*** -2.642*** -1.121*** 
 (0.128) (0.0744) (0.142) (0.0813) (0.149) (0.0872) (0.153) (0.0881) 
         
Observations 17,371 17,371 17,371 17,371 17,371 17,371 17,371 17,371 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
 
Note: Different operationalizations of variables in same color (e.g. conflict and veto players represent veto player 
dimension and are orange). 
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Appendix F: Models With Correlated Standard Errors  
Table 4.9: Model With Correlated Standard Errors (State) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES sub_not late_not athrho 
    
Notification prior to the adoption date 0.310*** -0.210***  
 (0.0516) (0.0419)  
Ministerial approval 0.250 -0.281  
 (0.216) (0.224)  
Strong -0.138** -0.116  
 (0.0495) (0.0836)  
Veto Players -0.205* -0.117  
 (0.101) (0.132)  
Strong x Veto Players 0.0723** 0.0532  
 (0.0237) (0.0370)  
Parliamentary involvement = 1 1.353*** -0.115  
 (0.215) (0.126)  
Parliament Involved x Strong -0.235*** 0.234***  
 (0.0579) (0.0354)  
Parliament Involved x Veto Players -0.433** 0.178*  
 (0.148) (0.0882)  
Parliament Involved x Strong x Veto Players 0.129*** -0.0846***  
 (0.0384) (0.0232)  
Agriculture -0.548*** 0.190*  
 (0.0747) (0.0852)  
Environment 0.633*** 0.159*  
 (0.105) (0.0740)  
Interior 0.841*** -0.0811  
 (0.191) (0.297)  
Industry/trade -0.192** 0.0601  
 (0.0677) (0.0862)  
Public administration 0.944*** 0.175  
 (0.189) (0.132)  
Public health 0.0606 -0.225+  
 (0.0980) (0.122)  
Finance -0.303*** -0.862***  
 (0.0587) (0.150)  
Transport -0.224+ 0.0295  
 (0.115) (0.115)  
Council = 1 0.817*** 0.157**  
 (0.0753) (0.0535)  
Page length 0.876*** 0.970***  
 (0.128) (0.127)  
Complexity 0.0644   
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 (0.0398)   
Bureaucratic Efficiency -0.201** -0.409***  
 (0.0624) (0.0795)  
Deadline length  0.145***  
  (0.0134)  
Constant -1.914*** -0.543 0.0601+ 
 (0.254) (0.351) (0.0347) 
    
Observations 17,371 17,371 17,371 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Appendix F (con’t) Correlated Standard Errors by Directive 
Table 4.10: Model With Correlated Standard Errors (Directive) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES sub_not late_not athrho 
    
Notification prior to the adoption date 0.310*** -0.210***  
 (0.0565) (0.0417)  
Ministerial approval 0.250 -0.281*  
 (0.236) (0.137)  
Strong -0.138*** -0.116***  
 (0.0283) (0.0171)  
Veto Players -0.205*** -0.117***  
 (0.0520) (0.0304)  
Strong x Veto Players 0.0723*** 0.0532***  
 (0.0149) (0.00884)  
Parliamentary involvement = 1 1.353*** -0.115  
 (0.211) (0.188)  
Parliament Involved x Strong -0.235*** 0.234***  
 (0.0695) (0.0584)  
Parliament Involved x Veto Players -0.433** 0.178+  
 (0.134) (0.101)  
Parliament Involved x Strong x Veto Players 0.129** -0.0846**  
 (0.0393) (0.0299)  
Agriculture -0.548*** 0.190+  
 (0.150) (0.113)  
Environment 0.633*** 0.159  
 (0.157) (0.132)  
Interior 0.841* -0.0811  
 (0.428) (0.240)  
Industry/trade -0.192 0.0601  
 (0.139) (0.108)  
Public administration 0.944*** 0.175  
 (0.248) (0.229)  
Public health 0.0606 -0.225  
 (0.254) (0.180)  
Finance -0.303 -0.862***  
 (0.188) (0.154)  
Transport -0.224 0.0295  
 (0.191) (0.139)  
Council = 1 0.817*** 0.157***  
 (0.119) (0.0459)  
Page length 0.876*** 0.970***  
 (0.263) (0.217)  
Complexity 0.0644   
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 (0.0685)   
Bureaucratic Efficiency -0.201*** -0.409***  
 (0.0279) (0.0181)  
Deadline length  0.145***  
  (0.0273)  
Constant -1.914*** -0.543*** 0.0601+ 
 (0.203) (0.132) (0.0347) 
    
Observations 17,371 17,371 17,371 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
 
 149 
Chapter V: Conclusions 
 
 This dissertation explored the conditions under which European Union member 
countries fail to comply with European Union legislative mandates. Membership in the 
European Union requires compliance with European Union legislation, legislation that is 
drafted collectively by member states. Despite their strong role in crafting these agreements, 
many states struggle to comply with them. Noncompliance is a problem in the EU but is not 
unique to European Union member states. Compliance issues plague agreements more 
generally at both the international level in treaties and international organizations and within 
states themselves often in the form of bureaucrats implementing policy. Understanding why 
and how states fail to comply can provide useful insight into why some agreements fail while 
others succeed.  
 I focus upon European Union member state noncompliance and make a novel 
distinction between two types of noncompliance, late and substantive. While research has 
emphasized the role of timeliness in satisfying legislative mandates, less attention has 
focused upon whether or not states substantively comply with the body of legislation. In 
previous studies, the emphasis has been upon explaining why states fail to comply with 
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directives as indicated by enacting legislation past a deadline or by the sheer number (or 
proportion) of infringements incurred by a member state. Although this is certainly an 
important component of compliance, compliance is a nuanced concept that has different 
facets. For example on both measures, number of infringements and timing, Italy performs 
quite poorly. However, if the question of interest is how states fail to meet their obligations, 
rather than whether or how often, we see that although Italy consistently obtains high 
numbers of infringements overall, patterns among types of noncompliance emerge.  
 Work that has explored the relationship between timing and infringement indicates that 
there is, at best, little connection between the timing and ultimate correctness of legislation 
(Mastenbroek 2007). This is borne out in my analysis, which finds a correlation of 0.50 
between late and substantive infringements across member states between 2002 and 2009. It 
is likely that instead of no connection, the relationship between timing and implementation is 
negative: Thomson (2007) and König and Mäder (2013) suggest that there is a tradeoff 
between timely implementation and the quality of transposition. Literatures that focus only on 
timeliness assume substantive compliance while studies of infringements assume similar 
underlying processes. Distinguishing between late and substantive infringements enables us 
to study the important phenomenon of substantive infringement. While late infringements are 
certainly important, substantive infringements are likely to have a greater impact on the 
functioning of the EU, as substantive infringements are more likely to go on longer before, if, 
they are discovered. Thus, distinguishing between the two is essential for understanding the 
conditions under which each emerges: broad strokes approaches can’t address this. 
 Beyond combining late and substantive infringements, the literature also does not 
make clear distinctions regarding how the different aspects of the policymaking process 
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contribute to negative outcomes, be they delay or infringements. Thus, while implementation 
of EU legislation has received considerable attention, previous approaches have not 
distinguished late from substantive failures. This broad approach misses the distinct 
processes contributing separately to late and substantive infringements. Those who have 
undertaken work to compare timing to infringements overall have posited that a negative 
relationship exists between the two as states choose to prioritize either timeliness or 
substance. As a result, there are not clear predictions regarding when these types of 
noncompliance might occur and the means through which each type of noncompliance 
develops. I addressed this lacuna, explaining the conditions under which late and substantive 
infringement occur, clarifying the role of preferences and how the design of directives 
contributes to each of these outcomes. I constructed a model that contrasts late and 
substantive infringements against one another to best evaluate the ‘tradeoff’ that states make 
in the implementation process. 
 I found that late infringements occur when states delay in implementing legislation 
while substantive infringements arise when states implement legislation at odds with the 
intent of the directive, either by failing to meet all the objectives of the directive or by failing to 
enforce enacted legislation.  
 More precisely, substantive infringements arise when three conditions are 
simultaneously present: actors not only disagree with a directive, AND they have the power to 
affect national legislation, AND they have the opportunity to do so, in the parliament. Late 
infringements arise when only some of these conditions are present: when actors disagree 
but lack tools to substantively influence legislation, e.g. when they have weak parliamentary 
powers but disagree with content, or when strong parliaments are involved in the passage of 
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legislation during the transposition process. My approach demonstrates that distinguishing 
between late and substantive infringements captures a phenomenon that is likely to increase 
over time as parliaments become increasingly involved in transposition. Furthermore, my 
analysis provides an explanation for why and when late and substantive infringements are 
likely to occur, something the literature has so far overlooked. 
Implications  
 
The increasing role of parliaments in drafting and transposing directives is likely to 
contribute to higher levels of substantive infringements while appearing to reduce late 
infringements. Parliaments are becoming more and more involved in implementation and 
design. New research by Finke et al (2015) points to how the involvement of national 
parliaments in negotiations is becoming increasingly more common and can potentially affect 
in-country negotiations on potential directives. The involvement of parliaments is important to 
understand, then, not only for understanding the timing of implementation, but how the 
potential substance of enacted measures corresponds to states’ legislation. Finke et al find 
that the involvement of parliament prior to a directive’s passage, during the drafting stages, 
slows down discussion but ultimately is associated with faster implementation after a directive 
is passed. Thus, the role of a parliament can be to both slow implementation (in the case of 
information asymmetries) and to effectively speed implementation (in the absence of such 
asymmetries).  
 Because infringements stem from conflict, analyzing them jointly can seem logical but 
approaches that conflate these two types of infringements will miss the potential tradeoff 
between timing and substance. Combining late and substantive infringements will lead 
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researchers to not only misunderstand the mechanisms behind these distinct types of 
infringements, but they will conclude that the involvement of parliament will potentially move 
member states toward greater levels of compliance when it indicates the opposite: more 
opportunities for unrecognized substantive noncompliance.  
Final Remarks 
 
 In conclusion, I have demonstrated that there is a distinct difference between late and 
substantive infringements, which has not been previously recognized by the literature. I have 
outlined the different features contributing to late and substantive infringements. Substantive 
infringements arise when there exists disagreement, power, and opportunity for actors to act 
on their disagreement with a directive. Late infringements arise when actors dislike a directive 
but lack the elements to shift policy outcomes.  
 In light of these findings, I have emphasized the importance of distinguishing between 
late and substantive infringements and demonstrated why considering them together is 
insufficient and misleading. Different actions must be taken to reduce the occurrence of late 
and substantive infringements separately. Providing policy guidance may help reduce 
uncertainty about implementation and thus speed transposition, but it will likely not reduce 
substantive infringements if member-state-level disagreements remain. To reduce substantive 
infringements, it may prove more fruitful to involve all member state actors in the drafting 
process, lest these opinions come out during the negotiation of national transposing 
measures, resulting in stalemate or substantive shortcomings. Some steps have already been 
made in this direction, with the Commission’s attempts to involve national parliaments more 
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directly in earlier phases of policy design with the ‘Yellow Card’ System.55 However, more 
inroads could still be made in the consultation process at both the EU and national levels. 
 Beyond the application to the European Union, certainly an important domain of study, 
this dissertation has broader applicability to more general questions of law. Lawmakers 
grapple with questions of what makes laws ‘work’—why do some laws succeed while others 
fail? This dissertation provided a unique means to address these questions by focusing upon 
15 states working to enact the same legislative goals in the same period with differing levels 
of institutional ability and institutional structures. The differing levels of preferences by veto 
players and, specifically, policy-area ministers, combined with the different topics and 
complexity of EU directives provides a unique opportunity to conduct a study on legislation.  
 The dissertation permits a closer inspection of the different elements of legislation to 
find what contributes to a directive’s success and failure from the perspective of design and 
function. For design, I included such elements as the policy domain, length, and complexity of 
the directive. For function, I included the different actors and their preferences and capacities 
(at the national level). Never before have these two factors been able to be investigated in this 
manner at this scale.  
While this dissertation surely has not addressed the entire problem of noncompliance, 
nor have I answered every question that may arise. However, I have provide the first steps in 
moving toward a more comprehensive outlook toward legislative design and then evaluating 
the role the respective factors play. I demonstrate the power possessed by the actor charged 
with initiating the draft legislation, in the EU case, the policy-area minister. I also show how 
different types of legislation can fail at different rates depending upon the type of legislation, 
                                                       
55 http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/eus-yellow-card-comes-age-subsidiarity-unbound 
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although this is not evaluated in-depth within the dissertation.  
I provide a means to not only place the successes and failures of the European Union’s 
policy agenda into a broader context, but I also provide an explanation for these successes 
and failures, testing them empirically. This cohesive approach provides a foundation for future 
research into both the EU in particular and into legislation more generally. With the recent 
referendum by the United Kingdom and the popular vote to leave the EU, understanding how 
to evaluate possible non-compliance by non-member states will become increasingly more 
relevant if other member states choose a path similar to that of the UK. The face of the EU, 
and its ability to monitor and sanction noncompliance, will likely continue to evolve. This 
dissertation offers the means to analyze that evolution. 
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